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Abstract
VIGILANCE OR TOLERANCE? : AMBIVALENCE AND ATTITUDE 
ACCESSIBILITY IN RESPONSE TO TERRORIST THREATS
by
Julie Tison
Adviser: Professor Glen Hass
This research explored the cognitive processes underlying the Response 
Amplification Effect (RAE). which is ambivalent people's tendency to judge the 
object of their ambivalence (typically, a stigmatized other) more extremely than a 
comparable control target. Being in a state o f ambivalence is known to be 
uncomfortable. This discomfort may be dealt with by implementing changes in the 
accessibility level of attitudinal elements. It is suggested that cognitions compatible 
with the side of the ambivalence made salient by the current situation will be super­
activated and that incompatible elements will be sub-activated, thus leading to 
amplified reactions congruent with the current context. In a first study, conducted 
soon after the September I Ith 2001 Al-Qaeda-led terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, 
attitudes toward people of Middle Eastern/Arab origin were assessed. Participants 
completed a personality survey followed by exposure to two vignettes in which men 
believed to be of Middle Eastern origin were described as behaving in an ambiguous 
manner (i.e. their behavior could be interpreted as threatening or not threatening). 
Participants' interpretation of the situation, along with the degree of conflict 
experienced, were assessed. Results revealed that many individuals in the sample felt
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Vconflicted between being tolerant and/or vigilant toward members of the target group. 
The second experiment followed the same procedures as the first with the addition of 
a vignette priming either tolerance or vigilance concerns. This text served as a 
priming context for a subsequent lexical decision task in which participants' response 
time to categorize items as words or nonwords was measured. Some o f the words 
were compatible with tolerance concerns; others were compatible with vigilance 
concerns. It was expected that ambivalent individuals would show increased 
accessibility of words congruent with the prime along with inhibition o f items 
incompatible with the prime. Non-ambivalent subjects' reaction times were expected 
to reflect their dominant attitude and not be strongly affected by the prime. No 
difference in accessibility level was found across priming conditions nor was any 
difference found between ambivalent, tolerance-, and vigilance-oriented participants. 
A critical review of previous accounts of the RAE as well as implications of the 
current findings are also discussed.
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IChapter I: Overview
The purpose of this project is to explore the cognitive processes associated 
with feelings o f ambivalence, which can be defined as concurrent positive and 
negative feelings toward a certain object/person. Being unsure of one's feelings 
toward a target is generally accompanied by feelings of discomfort. Most people have 
at some point in their lives felt the uneasiness associated with being of two minds and 
the pressure that often accompanies decision-making under such circumstances. This 
unpleasant experience is felt even more strongly when one is not simply indecisive 
but rather has strong opposing feelings about a person or object. Indeed, in some 
instances, people have been known to simultaneously experience favorable and 
unfavorable feelings regarding an issue. For example, the current debate over stem 
cell research has sparked a wave of controversy as well as intensely conflicted 
feelings. One may feel that the knowledge gained from such research would be 
invaluable and yet also be wary about potential uses of such technological advances.
1.1 What is Ambivalence Anvwav?
Ambivalence is a psychological state characterized by the coexistence of 
positive and negative feelings. Specifically, a person feels conflicted about a 
particular attitude object, be it another person, group, situation, political position, 
decision, etc. This condition tends to be associated with indecision, discomfort, and 
some degree of tension. The particular situation is sometimes fairly trivial, such as 
deciding which theater seats to purchase, but can also have crucial consequences, for 
instance deciding whether or not to accept a position in a new institution. The more 
significant the outcomes, the more tension will result from those ambivalent feelings.
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Thus, behind the benefit o f objectivity that lies in the ability to see both sides of an 
issue hides the unpleasant cost of confusion and agitation. This undesirable 
consequence should be warded off by the workings of the attitude system, however, 
attitudes do not always operate under idealized stipulations. Attitudes are that part of 
the cognitive system responsible for providing a quick summary of one's feelings and 
beliefs about a particular object. Those summaries are believed to be stored in 
memory and their main function is to provide a fast and relatively effortless way of 
sizing up and thus interacting with the environment.
1.1.2 When Attitudes Fail
Attitudes represent the knowledge, beliefs, and feelings one has about things, 
stored along with behavioral inclinations particular to those objects. What makes 
attitudes a unique part of memory structure is the affective component attached to 
each. In addition to containing what one knows about an object, attitudes also include 
feelings one has about this object. Attitudes are readily accessible in memory and are 
believed, when they are strongly held, to provide an automatic evaluation of an 
object. They thus serve to maximize the efficiency of information processing by 
allowing one to get an almost immediate affective and behavioral reaction to an 
object without needing to carefully consider every aspect of it. This ultimate purpose, 
however, does not apply to the case o f ambivalence, which can be seen as a failure of 
the psychological attitude system. Feelings of ambivalence occur when competing 
evaluations are offered by the attitude system, leading to inconsistency and unstable 
reactions. Ambivalent attitudes are strongly held and thus important to the individual, 
and yet, they do not provide the person with the clear evaluation that is the raison
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3d'etre o f attitudes. Indeed, if attitudes do not provide an evaluation, they are nothing 
more than concepts stored in memory. In that sense, a state of ambivalence can be 
perceived as attitudes failing at their information processing function.
1.2 Ambivalence and Its Effects 
Being ambivalent has the obvious consequence o f making the categorization 
process (e.g. good/bad, like/dislike) rather challenging, leading to difficulty with 
regards to choosing an appropriate path of action. Underlying this latent uncertainty is 
discomfort, negative arousal, tension, etc (Hass. Katz. Rizzo, Bailey. & Moore.
1992). Ambivalence is thus not a state that is pleasant or desirable and is generally 
met with torment and distress. In addition to its influence on mood, ambivalence has 
been found to affect behavior (Katz. 1981) as well as information processing (Jonas. 
Diehl. & Bromer, 1997; Maio. Bell. & Esses, 1996). One important effect in this area 
of research is the finding that people who have ambivalent feelings toward a certain 
person (generally, one possessing some kind of social stigma) sometimes show a 
tendency to judge that person in an extreme fashion (negatively or positively, 
depending on the relevant context). For instance, a stigmatized person performing a 
socially desirable act would be judged more positively than a non-stigmatized person 
performing the same act; conversely, ambivalent individuals tend to perceive a 
stigmatized person performing an undesirable act more negatively than a comparable 
non-stigmatized target. Those who do not have mixed feeling seem to be less affected 
by the present situation and have reactions that tend to be more stable.
This tendency toward extreme reactions has been coined "response 
amplification”. Some proposals have been put forth to account for this effect, but
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4important shortcomings are present in these theories. The models currently available 
fail to consider a number of facts and a careful review of the existing research will 
show that the proposed theories have not always been tested in a sufficiently rigorous 
manner.
1.3 Goals of the Research 
One of the goals of the present research is to fill in some of the gaps left 
behind by prior inquiries and to submit the notion of response amplification to a more 
stringent test. The main goal, however, is to test a revised formulation o f the problem 
by focusing on changes in accessibility levels that are believed to be the starting point 
of those polarized reactions. The purpose of this research is therefore to explore the 
cognitive changes believed to be at the root of the response amplification effect. Up 
until now. limited attention has been given to the cognitive processes underlying the 
effect. The argument made in this report is that the phenomenon is partly a function 
of differing accessibility levels among elements composing ambivalent attitudes. The 
present suggestion is that changes in degree of accessibility are a joint function of 
motivational and structural factors. Specifically, we argue that ambivalent individuals 
are motivated to reduce internal conflict and that this conflict reduction is 
accomplished by implementing changes in the structure of attitudes.
The present report begins with a brief description of the nature of attitudes 
and their function, with special attention being devoted to certain aspects of attitude 
structure that allow for the existence of conflict (i.e. simultaneous activation of 
opposing elements, i.e. ambivalence). Ambivalence, its particularities and associated 
factors will be discussed, followed by a description of the response amplification
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5effect and its various accounts. We will then focus on the proposed role of 
accessibility in the effect, discussing the factors affecting the degree of accessibility 
of attitudinal elements. The point will be made that attitudes are best viewed as 
components of memory structure and that effects typically associated with semantic 
memory similarly affect the accessibility of attitudes. We will attempt to apply recent 
findings in memory research to the idea that internal conflict (i.e. ambivalence) may 
be dealt with by modifying the structure of attitudes.
The present position is that joint effects of social and cognitive factors are at 
the source of the effect known as response amplification. In previous reports (e.g.
Hass et al.. 1992; Katz, 1981; Katz & Hass, 1988), the cognitive aspect of the issue 
has been mentioned merely ert passant. without much further elaboration regarding its 
nature and workings. Scientists in the field are thus aware of the role played by 
cognitive factors but so far have only hinted at what those factors might be. Some 
(e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Cacioppo. Gardner. & Bemtson. 
1999; Downing, Judd. & Brauer, 1992; Fazio, 1989) have suggested that cognitive 
changes occur in the structure of attitudes but exactly what brings about these 
changes is a puzzle that has yet remained unsolved and that has never been directly 
tested. The goal of the present research is therefore to fill in an important gap in the 
literature by providing evidence about some of the cognitive processes underlying 
social events.
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6Chapter 2: Attitudes and Ambivalence
This section begins with a brief description of attitudes and their function, 
following which the concept of ambivalence will be carefully reviewed. We will then 
enter the main part of this chapter whose goal is to describe the response 
amplification effect and some its current accounts. Katz (1981) can be seen as the 
instigator of research in this particular area of ambivalence. Katz' account (1981.
Katz & Hass, 1988) proposed the extreme reaction showed by ambivalent individual 
is caused by an inherent threat to self-regard and that this threat results from 
possessing conflicted feelings. Any one-sided information will invariably contradict 
some part of the attitude and the resulting discomfort is believed to lead the 
ambivalent person to overemphasize the importance of the current context as a sort of 
compensation for that uncertainty.
Even though data has provided support for part of the theory, there has. as of 
yet. not been any substantial evidence that self-regard (or any related threat) plays any 
role in the effect. In the last ten years, a simpler and more straightforward suggestion 
has been made to explain the phenomenon. Bell & Esses (1997) suggest that priming 
is at the core of the effect. Again some evidence supports this idea but the research 
carried out has some potentially significant flaws and alternative explanations of the 
effect are not ruled out by the existing data. Moreover, the priming idea does not. by 
itself, account for the effect unless some sort of inhibitory mechanism is also 
involved. Some of these issues will be reviewed in this section. It will also be seen 
that, in addition to the shortcomings of existing empirical endeavors, the robustness 
of the response amplification effect can be called into question.
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7Many have failed to replicate the effect and even in cases where it is found, it 
seems to be somewhat weak and rather fickle. This fact has lead some of the leaders 
in this domain to list a number of conditions that must be met for the effect to appear 
(Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Eisenstadt, 1991 -  to be reviewed in a later section). In 
spite of these limitations, it is important to note that the mere fact that ambivalence 
exists has important implications for the concept of attitudes. The watchful observer 
will have noticed that, historically, attitude theory has not paid much attention to 
ambivalence. In a way, ambivalence has been treated as the black sheep of the 
attitude system, that is, as something known to exist but that “puts to shame" the ideal 
workings of the attitudinal system. Fortunately, recent developments in attitude 
theory have given a deserved place to conflicted evaluations (e.g. Cacioppo & 
Bemtson. 1994).
2.1 The Nature of Attitudes 
Attitudes are best thought of as memory representations of an association 
between an object and one's evaluation of that object (Cacioppo & Bemtson. 1994: 
Fazio, 1989; Fazio. Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes. 1986; Ostrom. Skowronski. & 
Nowak, 1994; Pratnakis, 1989). At its best, this representation can be used to guide 
behavior and to increase the efficiency of information processing by giving the 
individual a quick and relatively effortless way of categorizing objects and events 
(Bargh, 1996; Chen & Bargh. 1999). Multiple decisions are made on a daily basis, 
some of which will have long-lasting and defining consequences (such as accepting a 
new job), some others that will be fairly common and inconsequential (such as 
choosing a pair of socks). Behind every decision, however hackneyed it may be, lie a
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8cascade o f thoughts and alternatives. Still, several of life’s decisions seem to be made 
effortlessly, many of them being carried out automatically (Bargh, 1996), without 
even realizing a choice has been made.
People have an amazing ability to understand the world and choose adequate 
paths of action, even though they are constantly being bombarded by information. 
Even more impressive is the fact that individuals are generally able to do so in a split 
second in spite of the endless flow of stimulation saturating the senses. We are 
somehow able to select and further process pertinent input and quickly reject 
irrelevant or interfering material, apparently without overwhelming the capacities of 
the cognitive system. Quickly evaluating an object or situation along positive or 
negative lines thus allows one to opt for an adequate response. For instance, judging 
an event as hostile or dangerous should result in a motivation to avoid such a 
situation, whereas one should be motivated to approach a hospitable environment. 
Getting the general impression of a situation is therefore an important function of the 
affect system (Cacioppo et al.. 1999). Cacioppo et al. argue that, although the 
behavior resulting from the assessment conducted by the affect system is generally 
constrained to bivalent tendencies (approach vs. avoidance), the underlying 
evaluative processes are best construed as falling along separable dimensions. The 
antecedents of behavioral inclinations (i.e. evaluative processes) are therefore not 
bipolar in nature.
2.1.1 The Attitudinal Evaluative Process
Cacioppo (Cacioppo & Bemtson, 1994; Cacioppo & Bemtson. 1999; 
Cacioppo et al., 1999) posits that at least two evaluative channels are involved in
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9computing attitudes. One o f those channels is responsible for the processing of 
threatening (negative) information, while the other processes positive (appetitive) 
input. The combined outputs of those assessment processors are then used to compute 
general behavioral predispositions toward the appraised stimulus. It should be noted 
that a high degree of positivity does not entail the absence of negative affect.
Actually, a given stimulus input may have similar or different effects on the positive 
and negative dimensions. Cacioppo and his colleagues discuss three possible modes 
of evaluative activation. A stimulus can have opposing effects on the evaluative 
dimensions, for example increasing activation on the positive vector and decreasing 
activation on the negative vector, thus providing clear behavioral guidance (in this 
case, approach). Conversely, a stimulus could have similar effects (increasing or 
decreasing activation) on both positivity and negativity, resulting in inherently 
unstable behavioral tendencies. Finally, the stimulus could affect one dimension only, 
leaving the other to remain stable.
This formulation illustrates the complexity and the depth of analysis involved 
in a process that seems to take place somewhat fluently. The underlying concept is 
that evaluations form the core of attitude theory. An attitude should be thought of as 
an evaluation of an object that is based on knowledge, beliefs, and experiences one 
has had with that object. This attitude can then be used to classify a target as desirable 
or undesirable. This process may taint subsequent interpretation and inferences made 
about the attitude object. Indeed people usually rely on their current knowledge to 
arrange incoming information in a manner consistent with the existing attitude (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1991). Attitudes can be used to help maintain an optimal level of cognitive
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consistency through processes such as selective attention or selective interpretation of 
input. Some have also suggested that individuals seek out information consistent with 
their beliefs and expectations, especially following strong behavioral commitment to 
a position (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987; Pratnakis, 1989). Moreover, individuals feel an 
inherent drive to reduce internal discrepancies (Fiske & Taylor. 1991) as such 
conflicts impede categorization, leading to discomfort and uncertainty in dealing with 
the attitude object.
Feelings of ambivalence will result whenever attitudes contain inconsistencies 
along the evaluative dimension, for instance in a case where an attitude object has 
some very positive qualities along with some less desirable qualities. For example, a 
person may think of physician-assisted suicide as a viable solution to constant pain 
and suffering, while at the same time believing that no one has the right to take one's 
own life. Similarly, one may feel that animal experimentation is an important and 
valuable tool for research while simultaneously believing that humans have no right 
to use animals for their own welfare. Having such conflicted attitudes about an 
object/topic makes the categorization process all the more difficult and may result in 
inconsistent behavioral choices.
2.2 Ambivalence: What It Is. What It Is Not 
We have seen that ambivalence is characterized by the coexistence o f positive 
and negative feelings. Precisely, ambivalence can be defined as a state in which one 
has opposing affective reactions to a single object (Hass et al., 1992). An ambivalent 
person thus experiences simultaneous like and dislike (Maio et al., 1996) and has 
difficulty getting a clear evaluation of the attitude object. Inconsistencies in the
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structure of attitudes can take many forms. One common misconception is to equate 
ambivalence to indifference. Indifference is a condition in which an individual has no 
strong preference and does not show any strong like or dislike for an attitude object. 
Indifference is a state of neutrality associated with low levels of affect and lacks the 
notion of conflict that is so crucial to ambivalence. Indifference is actually quite the 
opposite of ambivalence. Whereas indifference is a lack of strong emotional reaction 
or preference, ambivalence originates from feelings that are both extreme (strong) and 
conflicted (i.e. both positive and negative dimensions are highly activated, see Hass & 
Eisenstadt, 1993). Ambivalence thus consists of intense conflicted emotional 
reactions to a single attitude object. An ambivalent person will feel strong opposing 
forces toward an object that s/he considers of great importance.
2.2.1 Is Ambivalence Nothing More Than Another Name for Dissonance?
Although the concepts of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957; Cooper & Fazio, 1984) share a focus on conflicting portions of attitudes, they 
are two distinct concepts, each associated with its own set of effects. The crucial 
distinction is found in the nature of that conflict. In the case of cognitive dissonance, 
one's attitude is definite and there is no questioning of one’s beliefs. The typical 
dissonance situation is one in which people are pressed into taking action that goes 
against their attitudes. Inconsistencies between different components of attitudes are 
at the core of dissonance theory whereas ambivalence is characterized by opposing 
affective reactions toward an attitude object. Thus in cognitive dissonance, one's 
feelings (attitude) are clearly defined and not at all ambiguous. In ambivalence, the 
affective reaction itself is conflicted as it holds both positive and negative elements.
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Thus, in one case (ambivalence) the conflict is purely at the affective level and in the 
other (dissonance) the conflict is between distinct components (e.g. cognitive and 
behavioral) of the attitude.
2.2.2 Conflicted Evaluations
The conflict in ambivalence may lead someone to feel pulled apart between 
approach and avoidance. It should be noted that ambivalence requires the positive and 
negative dimensions to be independent components of attitudes that can be (but need 
not and often are not) simultaneously activated (Bell, Esses and Maio, 1996;
Cacioppo & Bemtson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1999; Hass & Eisenstadt, 1993; Jonas et 
al., 1997; Katz& Hass, 1988; Petty. Wegener. & Fabrigar. 1997; Priester& Petty. 
1996). Since it is possible to concurrently hold positive and negative opinions about a 
single attitude object, it is best to think of positivity and negativity as two separate 
and independent dimensions. The existence of ambivalence shows that holding a 
highly positive position toward an object does not entail the absence of negative 
feelings. It is indeed possible for someone to both favor and oppose a certain issue at 
the same time. Given this fact, it is perhaps more adequate to represent attitudes as a 
set of unipolar dimensions (from zero to extremely negative and from zero to 
extremely positive), rather than as one bipolar dimension (from very negative to very 
positive). The degree of conflict (i.e. ambivalence) will be at its highest when the 
positive and negative dimensions are highly activated simultaneously (Cacioppo & 
Bemtson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1999), that is, the greater and more similar the 
opposing forces, the greater the ambivalence (Scott -  in Hass & Eisenstadt, 1993; 
also Priester& Petty, 1996).
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Such conflicts are likely to arise whenever there are inconsistencies between 
different sources o f information. Since attitudes are typically derived from many 
different types of information, discrepancies among those sources (e.g. cognitive, 
behavioral, and affective) are not rare. Thus, attitudes are based on a set of beliefs and 
cognitions that are not necessarily consistent with one another (Fiske & Taylor. 1991; 
Hass & Eisenstadt. 1993) and the feelings expressed toward an attitude object will 
likely be a function of the cluster of cognitions activated at any specific point in time 
(Hass, 1981; Tourangeau, Rasinski, & D'Andrade. 1991; Zanna & Rempel. 1988). 
Ambivalent attitudes are especially likely to be unstable in their expression and are 
poor predictors of behavior since the range of acceptable positions is fairly large 
(Cacioppo et al.. 1999; Hass & Eisenstadt. 1993).
2.3 Earlv Research on Ambivalence 
A significant portion of the research on ambivalence has focused on people's 
reactions to members of stigmatized groups. For instance. Gergen and Jones (1963) 
found that participants showed extreme reactions to an individual described as 
“mentally ill'’. Subjects were found to experience either positive or negative 
responses to the target depending on whether the stigmatized person's behavior had 
positive or negative consequences for the rater. Similarly, Dienstbier (1970) reported 
that an African-American target was judged more favorably than a comparable White 
target when both were described in a positive way. but the opposite pattern appeared 
when both stimulus persons were given negative traits. One should note, however, 
that even though this pattern of responses was consistent, the differences between the 
two target persons were rather small (Katz, 1981).
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These early studies suggested that, in some cases, polarization might occur 
when the target is a member o f a stigmatized group. Katz (1981) reasoned that the 
presence of conflicted feelings might be a cause of those extreme judgments. One of 
his underlying assumptions is that stigma is associated with feelings of ambivalence 
for a large proportion of the population. In particular, it is suggested that people have 
both feelings of sympathy as well as aversion toward stigmatized individuals. Katz 
proposed that exposure to stigma elicits a certain degree of threat and apprehension, 
which may lead to a desire to avoid such individuals. He further argued that these 
negative feelings could be accompanied by reactions of sympathy and respect for one 
perceived as disadvantaged. Katz reports supporting evidence from a number of 
studies in which Black individuals displaying positive traits were generally evaluated 
more favorably and were more likely to be helped than a comparable White target. 
This pattern was often reversed when the targets were portrayed in a negative way 
(similar results were obtained with disabled targets - see Katz. 1981).
The fact that a stigmatized target's immediate behavior has a strong impact on 
judgment was interpreted as evidence of a "split" in the subject’s attitude, where one 
side of that attitude was heavily relied on in judgment whereas the opposite side was 
suppressed and thus played a minor role in affecting the overall rating of the target 
(this notion will be discussed in more detail below). The starting point o f Katz' 
account is that when faced with a stigmatized person, "an actor may perceive himself 
as having friendly feelings for a more-or-less discredited, unworthy other, or as 
having aversive feelings about someone less fortunate than himself’ (Katz, 1981. p. 
24). This conflict is believed to threaten one's favorable self-regard, i.e. the
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perception o f the self as both “humane” and “discerning”, and to be associated with 
tension that can be further dealt with by defending one’s current position and 
rejecting the discredited portion of the attitude, presumably giving rise to the response 
amplification phenomenon.
2.3 The Response Amplification Effect (RAE)
Given the above discussion, it will not surprise the reader to find out that most 
o f the recent ambivalence research has also focused on reactions to outgroup 
(stigmatized) members, in particular, African-Americans (Katz, 1981; Katz & Hass, 
1988; Hass et al., 1991; Hass et al.. 1992). and Natives (Bell and Esses. 1997; Maio. 
Esses & Bell, 1994; Maio et al.. 1996). The same perplexing finding is found in these 
studies as well, with ambivalent participants showing a tendency to judge stigmatized 
others more extremely than comparable non-stigmatized targets. For example, a 
stigmatized person performing a socially undesirable act may be perceived in a more 
negative fashion than a non-stigmatized person performing the same behavior. 
Similarly, ambivalent subjects tend to perceive a stigmatized person involved in a 
socially desirable situation in a more positive way than a non-stigmatized person 
involved in the same situation.
This polarization in judgment is indeed surprising since one might expect that, 
given the presence of both positive and negative feelings, ambivalent individuals may 
react more moderately than participants who have a clearly defined attitude toward 
the target. Therefore, the presence of amplified reactions seems to be at odds with 
basic common sense. Still, a number of possible explanations exist that can account 
for the RAE. The two models to be reviewed put feelings of ambivalence at the center
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of the effect but focus on different consequences that those conflicted feelings may 
have on the individual. The first model (a fuller description of Katz’ formulation) 
emphasizes the importance of social and affective factors in dealing with ambivalence 
whereas the second concentrates on the cognitive consequences of ambivalence.
These ideas will be presently reviewed along with a report and assessment o f relevant 
data.
2.4.1 Threat to Self-Regard Hypothesis
The starting point o f the “threat to self-regard” formulation is that, when 
considering stigmatized others, a certain degree of racial bias is quite common and 
people’s attitudes toward members of stigmatized groups tend to have both positive 
and negative dimensions. Katz (1981) proposed that making ambivalence salient 
leads to emotional tension and discomfort since ambivalent subjects wish to see 
themselves as “humane, yet discerning” toward others. The “humane" portion of the 
self-concept may lead one to perceive the stigmatized person in a positive light, as 
someone who has had to battle the injustices of an unfair society; while the 
“discerning” part would lead to a more critical stance and be associated with more 
negative feelings so as to not give credit to someone who might be undeserving. In 
this sense, being made conscious of the presence of both positive and negative 
elements in one’s attitude structure might threaten one's favorable self-image. People 
have to face the possibility that they might possess some level o f (unjustified) bias (be 
it positive or negative) toward members of stigmatized groups, thus resulting in 
emotional tension. Efforts at reducing this tension are thought to give rise to the 
response amplification effect sometimes observed.
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Generally, people want to maintain a self-image of tolerance, open- 
mindedness and fair-mindedness (Katz, 1981; Katz & Hass, 1988). This task is made 
difficult when one must come to terms with conflicted feelings. When judging a 
member of a stigmatized group, a person may have both feelings of sympathy for an 
individual who has overcome the demands of an unfriendly society as well as feelings 
of aversion for an outgroup member who is also perceived as deviating from societal 
norms. The dimension of the attitude (positive or negative) that dominates judgment 
is likely to be a function of the situational variables present at the time. A situation in 
which a member of a stigmatized group behaves in a socially reprehensible manner is 
likely to discredit the feelings of sympathy one may have had. Conversely, an episode 
in which an outgroup member behaves in a socially desirable way will likely discredit 
the negative feelings one may have had. In the latter case, a person made aware of 
his/her ambivalent feelings may feel guilty of ever having unjustified negative 
opinions and subsequently compensate for them by amplifying their positive rating of 
the stigmatized person. When the stigmatized person behaves in an undesirable way. 
the ambivalent individual does not wish to give credit to someone they feel is 
undeserving and as a result, may amplify their negative rating of the target (Katz & 
Hass, 1988). It is therefore believed that the rater’s self-image will be restored by 
emphasizing whichever portion of the self that is congruent with the immediate 
situation.
2.4.1.1 On the role o f ambivalence
Hass et al. (1991) showed that African-American confederates portrayed in a 
positive way indeed received higher ratings than comparable White persons. White
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subjects were put into teams and participated in a game of trivia in which each group 
had a team captain who was responsible for selecting and reading the questions to the 
team members. The team captain was in fact a confederate and was, in half of the 
cases, an African-American male undergraduate (a Caucasian male undergraduate 
was the captain in the other cases). In the ‘'success'" condition, the captain picked easy 
questions, read them clearly and generally played a large role in the success of his 
team. In the "failure" condition, the captain picked difficult questions, wasted time, 
and made irrelevant comments, thus playing a large role in the poor performance of 
his team. Once the game was over, members of the team were asked to rate their 
captain on a series of traits (ability, motivation, and social traits). Post-game ratings 
showed the expected pattern. The African-American confederate received 
significantly lower ratings than the Caucasian confederate in the "failure"" condition 
and received generally higher ratings (although not significantly higher) than the 
Caucasian confederate in the "success" condition. There is therefore some evidence 
of response amplification when participants rate stigmatized others.
It should be noted that in this study (as well as the earlier ones like Gergen & 
Jones. 1963; Dienstbier. 1970, and Katz. 1981). ambivalence was not measured but 
rather assumed to have been present. It was presumed that a large enough contingent 
of ambivalent individuals would be sampled and drive the effect. Thus it cannot be 
stated with certainty that internal conflict is truly the key to the response 
amplification phenomenon. Hass et al’s (1991) second study looked more directly at 
the role of ambivalence and its effect on arousal. This study followed procedures 
identical to the first one, with the addition of an ambivalence measure. The
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assumption was that ambivalent subjects would have a higher need to justify their 
action (amplified ratings) because of increased tension due to their mixed feelings. 
Predictions suggested that ambivalent participants' ratings would be amplified in the 
positive direction in the success condition but would be polarized toward the negative 
end in the failure condition. Hass et al. thus expected to find a positive correlation 
between ambivalent feelings and ratings in the “success" condition (i.e. high degree 
of ambivalence associated with high ratings) and a negative correlation between 
ambivalence and ratings in the “failure” condition (high ambivalence associated with 
low ratings). Support for these predictions was found in the “success” condition but 
only weak support was found in the “failure” condition (the relationship was in the 
right direction albeit non-significant). This second study therefore provided modest 
support for the role of ambivalence in the response amplification effect.
However, it should be recalled that, according to the threat to self-regard 
model, ambivalence is only one part of the equation. The precise argument is that 
making ambivalence salient (thus threatening self-regard) leads to increased tension 
and it is the effort exerted at reducing this tension that is believed to lead to response 
amplification. The effect is thus described as being mediated by the emotional tension 
aroused by the subjects’ conflicted feelings. The above discussion suggests that 
ambivalence may play a role in the RAE. The idea that emotional tension/discomfort 
may be the mediating factor between ambivalence and polarized reactions was also 
explored (Hass et al., 1992).
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2.4.1.2 On the role o f arousal
The goal o f Hass et al.’s (1992) study was to examine the proposed link 
between ambivalence and emotional discomfort. White subjects were exposed to a 
neutral task or to a tape relating to a recent violent racial episode. In the latter, people 
in the affected community were heard making both favorable and unfavorable 
comments about African-Americans, thus making racial controversy and ambivalence 
salient. Subjects who were exposed to the controversial material (the “salience” 
condition) showed an increase in negative mood and an overall lower mood score 
than did subjects exposed to the neutral material (the control condition). Furthermore, 
a positive correlation was found between ambivalence and negative mood score in the 
salience condition. The control condition revealed no relationship between 
ambivalent feelings and mood. The authors concluded that, as suggested by Katz 
(1981), negative affect increases as ambivalent feelings are made salient. It thus 
appears as though Pro- and Anti-Black sentiments are seen as incompatible and that 
their simultaneous presence leads to emotional tension.
2.4.1.3 Evaluation o f  the model
Although the threat to self-regard formulation seems to be supported by 
research, most of the reported evidence is indirect. The idea that one may feel 
threatened by having assigned negative traits to someone deserving praise does make 
sense as this behavior raises the possibility of one having prejudicial attitudes. 
However, the credence of the threat to self-regard argument seems fairly weak when a 
stigmatized individual behaves in a negative way. Indeed, why would anyone feel 
remorseful about having had positive thoughts about someone? Katz (1981) argued
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that assigning positive traits to someone who is undeserving threatens the 
“discerning” part of the self-concept, but this seems to be a bit of a stretch. Although 
the role that social factors may play in the RAE will not be denied, the evidence so far 
reported is not all that convincing. Also one must admit that threat to self-regard is a 
fairly vague concept and may not be truly relevant (or even necessary) in explaining 
the response amplification effect. Negative affect in and of itself does not constitute 
evidence of a threat to self-concept. Indeed, the mere presence of inconsistent 
cognitions and uncertainty has long been believed to be associated with discomfort 
and negative arousal (see Fiske & Taylor. 1991). It is therefore not clear whether or 
not threat to self-regard is an essential component o f the RAE. Maybe more 
disturbing is the fact that the amplification effect itself is capricious, being revealed 
only some of the time and in very particular circumstances (a fact that we will come 
back to in later sections).
Even if we were to assume that the effect is a reliable one. the main objection 
to the self-regard hypothesis is that there is no direct evidence that ‘threat to self- 
regard” is indeed the mediator between ambivalence and polarized reactions (Bell & 
Esses. 1997; Hass et al., 1991). Moreover, to convincingly conclude on the role of 
ambivalence, it would be advisable to compare the behavior of ambivalent vs. non- 
ambivalent participants. This strategy would allow examination of the characteristics 
particular to ambivalent individuals, be they social, affective, or cognitive in nature. 
The cognitive realm is one that is likely to be of particular interest. If we accept the 
idea that attitudes are representations of the knowledge and feelings one has about an 
object, the fact that ambivalent people have entries on both positive and negative
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evaluative dimensions is particularly interesting. Finding out how such cognitive 
processes may affect judgment and possibly mediate the amplification effect may be 
particularly valuable.
Even though sometimes overlooked, there have been some speculations about 
the role played by cognitive processes in the amplified reactions. One of Katz* (1981) 
most intriguing suggestions is that, in the face of ambivalence, individuals find 
themselves relying heavily on (“enhancing ") current information and "suppressing " 
the other side of the attitude, such that behavior becomes polarized in either the 
negative or the positive direction. This process was argued to operate as a defense 
against conflict and uncertainty. Increasing reliance on one side of the attitude at the 
expense of the other should in fact reduce indecision, at least for a time. This 
suggestion hints not only that deeper cognitive processes may be at play in the RAE 
but also that such processes may be more directly associated with amplified reactions 
than the so-far-proposed sociai variables. The next model considered attempts to 
bridge the bridge the gap between social and cognitive factors, by focusing on the 
role that accessibility of information may play in the RAE.
2.4.2 Priming Mav Be the Key
The model proposed by Bell and Esses (1997) also takes the standpoint that 
feelings of ambivalence are a necessary component of the RAE. However, where 
Katz and Hass (1988) focused on social factors such as self-regard, Bell and Esses 
concentrate on the cognitive consequences of ambivalence. This interpretation of the 
effect is straightforward and described in purely cognitive terms. Response 
amplification is described as a simple priming effect in which current information
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eases processing of similar and compatible data. Whichever information is more 
accessible in memory will likely be used in judgment. For example, observing a 
stigmatized person perform a socially undesirable act should make the negative 
dimension of one’s attitude more accessible in memory and this ease of access may 
affect subsequent judgment.
The crucial characteristic of ambivalent attitudes is obviously their dual-sided 
nature. Possessing both positive and negative knowledge about an attitude object 
allows ambivalent individuals to have access to a large database. Bell and Esses 
(1997) proposed that since individuals with ambivalent attitudes have represented in 
memory positive as well as negative dimensions, both these dimensions are available 
to be primed. The context presented should then be the main factor determining 
which aspect of the attitude is most accessible. A positive act should prime the 
positive dimension and affect judgment in a positive way; a negative act should prime 
the negative dimension and influence subsequent judgment in a negative way. Since 
non-ambivalent individuals possess one dominant dimension (positive or negative), 
their evaluation o f a stigmatized person should be more stable and should not be 
affected in both directions. For example, a person possessing a negative attitude 
should consistently give negative evaluations, regardless of the target's behavior. 
Therefore, in this particular account, motivational factors (e.g. restoring a positive 
self-image) are not considered and the effect is believed to be the result of purely 
cognitive processes.
To test their hypothesis. Bell and Esses (1997) had to isolate the cognitive 
factors from the possible influence of motivational issues (specifically those having to
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do with conflict reduction/self-image restoration). Ambivalent feelings could not be 
made salient as that could give rise to a threat to self-regard and its associated 
emotional tension (Katz, 1981). Bell and Esses thus needed to create a situation in 
which they could compare the reactions o f ambivalent and non-ambivalent people 
and yet, had to make sure that the ambivalent feelings (and tension) were not raised.
A mood induction procedure was therefore used, as previous research has shown that 
mood can act as a prime. A negative mood renders negative (e.g. dark or unfavorable) 
thoughts more accessible, whereas a positive mood increases the accessibility of 
positive (e.g.. happy or favorable) thoughts. Bell and Esses predicted that ambivalent 
people’s evaluations of a stigmatized group would be differentially affected by 
positive and negative mood, but that non-ambivalent subjects would not show a large 
difference between the two mood conditions.
2.4.2.1 Ambivalence toward First Nations peoples
Given that this study was done in Canada, which does not share the United 
States' history with the Black community, the First Nations (Native Canadians) were 
used as the target of ambivalent feelings (the 1990s were particularly turbulent in 
Canadian Politics with regards to the First Nations’ concerns about protection of 
ancestral lands). Ambivalence toward Native Peoples was assessed (as part of a larger 
survey asking about many different ethnic groups) a week prior to the mood induction 
procedure. The second session (presented as a different study) had the subjects listen 
to a musical piece (mood induction) after which they were asked to fill out a survey 
assessing attitudes toward Native- and Anglo-Canadians (this research was carried in 
the province of Ontario, which is primarily populated by Anglophones) as well as
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endorsement of social policies regarding the First Nations. The separation o f the 
ambivalence measure and the mood manipulation in two separate sessions was 
believed to minimize the influence o f tension associated with feelings of 
ambivalence.
It was expected that ambivalent individuals' attitudes toward the First Nations 
would be more strongly affected by the mood manipulation than attitude toward 
Anglo-Canadians. Resulting attitudes should be in line with the specific mood 
conditions, that is, more favorable in the positive mood condition and less favorable 
in the negative mood condition. The first test looking at the effect of mood on 
ambivalent subjects’ reactions to Native- and Anglo-Canadians revealed to be non­
significant, presumably due to a weak effect of the negative mood induction 
procedure. Bell and Esses then re-classified the participants based on their self-report 
of mood, such that those subjects scoring in the top third of the mood measure were 
labeled as the “positive mood" group and those scoring in the bottom third were 
grouped under the “negative mood” category. Following this maneuver, results 
showed that, for ambivalent individuals, attitudes toward Natives were more greatly 
affected by mood than attitudes toward (Anglo)-Canadians. Non-ambivalent subjects 
did not show this difference. The obtained results therefore show a relative response 
amplification effect (i.e. greater difference between mood states when the target is a 
stigmatized group) obtained without making ambivalence salient (thus limiting the 
influence of discomfort).
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2.4.2.2 Evaluation o f  the model
Bell and Esses (1997) argue that the ambivalent group's change in attitude is 
due to the fact that ambivalent people accessed different dimensions of their attitude 
as a function of the mood prime. Non-ambivalent individuals did not show priming 
(even when the mood was congruent with their dominant attitude) suggesting that 
their attitudes may be more stable and resistant to change. Yet. one may wonder why 
non-ambivalent participants do not show priming. For example, an individual with a 
positive attitude toward Natives presumably possesses a set of positive thoughts 
relative to the group. Being primed by a positive mood should increase the 
accessibility of congruent thoughts and as a result, a momentary polarization should 
occur. It is not quite clear why priming would be observed for ambivalent subjects 
only. Since Bell and Esses’ (1997) data shows that initial attitudes toward Natives did 
not significantly differ across groups (M=70.15 for ambivalent group, M=69.83 for 
non-ambivalent out of a maximum of 100). both groups had equivalent “room to 
move” following the priming procedure. If the polarization effect were due to simple 
priming, both non-ambivalent subjects whose dominant attitude is congruent with the 
prime and ambivalent subjects should show enhanced ratings. Bell and Esses argue 
that ambivalent individuals show a RAE because they possess dimensions congruent 
with the prime. However, non-ambivalent subjects holding strong univalent attitudes 
congruent with the prime also possess these same dimensions but somehow do not 
show as strong a priming effect.
This pattern, though, could come simply as a function of how the groups were 
created. The fact that the participants were simply classified as ambivalent vs. non-
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ambivalent may be part of the problem. In all probability, the non-ambivalent group 
was composed of both Pro-First Nations and Anti-First Nations individuals. If we 
accept for a moment that priming plays a role, the Anti group would presumably 
show priming in the negative mood condition (dimension congruent with their 
attitude) whereas the Pro group would show priming in the positive mood condition. 
Lumping these two groups together into one "non-ambivalent” group prevents this 
sort o f comparison from taking place. This lack of a priming effect in the non- 
ambivalent group is possibly due to the fact that Pro- and Anti-Native participants' 
responses muffled each other’s. The fact that attitudes toward Anglo-Canadians 
(assumed to be positive given that the participants belonged to that group) were not as 
strongly affected by the prime also suggests that something more than priming may 
be at play. If a positive mood makes positive thoughts more accessible, this should 
affect all subjects and their reactions to all targets. However with a stigmatized target, 
what is observed following encounter with a one-sided attitudinal event is an 
amplified reaction from ambivalent people that goes over and beyond the reactions of 
non-ambivalent individuals. This suggests that the responses observed in the case of 
stigmatized targets are the result of something more than simple priming. The 
reasoning that the RAE occurs in ambivalent people because both dimensions are 
available to be primed still stands but should be tested in a more systematic manner. 
Priming as an explanation of the RAE still seems like an alternative worthy of further 
consideration but it probably does not cover the whole story.
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2.4.3 Overall Evaluation of Existing Proposals
The two proposals reviewed make logical sense but they both suffer from lack 
of strong empirical support. The priming account, for instance, is appealing given its 
simplicity, but the experiment carried out by Bell and Esses (1997) is not very 
convincing. For starters, they claim to be isolating the cognitive factors by not 
making ambivalence salient. Their reason for doing this is to minimize the role that 
emotional arousal may play in the effect. However, they resort to a mood 
manipulation as a priming condition. It is therefore not clear if the effect they 
obtained is due to priming per se or to motivational factors associated with changes in 
mood. It may well be that the mood state itself serves as a motivational factor in the 
polarization effect even when the mood state does not result from a threat to self- 
regard.
Bell and Esses (1997) also distinguish between the "strong” form of the RAE 
and the "relative” form o f amplification. The strong RAE is the finding that, in a 
positive situation, ambivalent individuals will respond more positively to a 
stigmatized person than to a non-stigmatized one and in a negative situation, will 
respond more negatively to a stigmatized target than to a non-stigmatized target. Thus 
in the strong form of the RAE, the polarization occurs in both dimensions. In the 
"relative” form of the RAE, ambivalent participants show a "greater difference in 
responses to a socially desirable and undesirable member of the stigmatized group 
than in responses to a socially desirable and undesirable member of a nonstigmatized 
group” (Bell and Esses, p. 1064). The "relative form” thus allows one to conclude 
that RA has taken place as long as responses to the stigmatized target are stronger
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(and not even necessarily significantly stronger) in one of the two directions. This is 
the finding that Bell and Esses have reported as significant, thus making any direct 
comparison to other studies (e.g. Hass et al, 1992) rather difficult. Although the 
relative form still suggests that ambivalent and non-ambivalent people react 
differently, the effect is not as strong nor as convincing as the "strong form” of the 
RAE. Yet, given the fairly low reliability of the strong form of the effect, relying on 
findings of relative response amplification may be justifiable.
The reports offered so far illustrate the fact that the response amplification 
effect only occurs under a fairly restricted set of circumstances. Hass et al. (1991) 
reported that the effect was more likely to be observed in situations that have personal 
relevance for the evaluator (e.g. Gergen & Jones. 1963: Gibbons. Stephan.
Stephenson, & Petty, 1980; Hass et al., 1991). that are high in experimental realism 
(i.e. able to get participants truly involved in the task -  e.g. Gergen & Jones. 1963: 
Gibbons et al.. 1980; Hass et al., 1991), or that threaten subjects* self-concept by 
making them aware of their conflicted feelings. For example, studies in which 
evaluations were derived merely from a written description o f a target the subject did 
not know nor would they ever meet (i.e. low personal relevance and weak 
involvement) did not show a significant polarization effect (Carver. Glass. Snyder. & 
Katz, 1977; Dienstbier. 1970; Linville & Jones. 1980). One exception to those 
conditions is the work o f Bell and Esses (1997) in which the polarization effect was 
obtained following a simple mood manipulation. In that particular case, subjects were 
not made aware of their conflicted feelings and the change in mood was not a
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function of inconsistency itself, but still the polarization effect (relative form) was 
observed.
The two reviewed models are interesting and provide major elements of the 
puzzle but some issues still remain unsolved. One important difference between the 
models if that they focus on different aspects of the problem. Whereas the threat to 
self-regard model emphasizes the affective and social factors implicated in the effect, 
the priming model focuses on the cognitive factors involved. Having such different 
models brings richness to the problem but there still are some missing pieces. Even 
though the threat to self-regard model does a good job describing the emotional and 
social factors potentially involved, there is no direct evidence that a threat to self- 
regard is involved at all. Also, no clear reference is made to the cognitive processes 
underlying the effect. Thus, the mechanism that actually triggers the amplification 
effect remains unclear. As for Bell and Esses’ model, the notion that priming plays a 
role in the effect is attractive by its simplicity and commonsensical feel. However, 
even though they suggest that ease of access lies at the root of the effect, accessibility 
itself is never directly assessed. The data show that ambivalent subjects’ judgment is 
more greatly affected by the prime however mere ratings represent but a poor 
measure of accessibility. It is probably best to consider both models, not as competing 
accounts, but really as complementary and in spite of some empirical shortcomings. 
Bell and Esses’ suggestion that priming mediates the response amplification is very 
attractive. Looking at the cognitive factors possibly involved in polarized reactions is 
definitely an avenue worth pursuing.
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Chapter 3: On The Role of Accessibility in Ambivalence -  A Revised Model
Since there is limited evidence available to suggest that a threat to self-regard 
is even involved in polarized reactions, our efforts concentrated on the role that 
accessibility might play in the response amplification effect. It has been shown that 
being in a state of ambivalence is uncomfortable and it is presumably the desire to 
reduce that discomfort that leads ambivalent individuals to react differently than non- 
ambivalent folks (Hass et al.. 1992). We propose that the best way to reduce that 
discomfort and indecision is by paying extra attention and by gathering as much 
information as possible about the situation, with the main goal of making an informed 
decision. Immediately available information should therefore be carefully evaluated 
and is likely to have a powerful impact on people's judgment, which is in fact what 
may be happening in the RAE. The priming account discussed earlier is consistent 
with this notion. We did however add one component to the priming idea.
The present model suggests that priming must be accompanied by a sub­
activation of incompatible attitudinal elements so as to avoid the resurgence of 
ambivalent feelings. Ambivalent individuals are motivated to modify an attitude 
structure that fails to serve its purpose. Possessing conflicted feelings hinders the 
categorization process and ambivalent people find themselves reacting to an attitude 
object in inconsistent ways, their reaction being compatible with whichever portion of 
their attitude is activated at the time. Presumably, priming kicks in following 
ambivalent people’s needs to re-arrange their schema toward consistency and 
coherence, working to render attitudes more stable and to avoid the simultaneous 
activation of the positive and negative dimensions of their attitude structure.
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One way to avoid the rising conflict is to activate only one dimension of the 
attitude. This is possibly what happens in the polarization effect. Being presented 
with a one-sided argument/situation may result in making compatible aspects of the 
attitude more salient. Those congruent elements may then be activated and become 
easier to access (and thus more likely to be used in judgment) through a simple 
priming process. Making one dimension more prominent and more accessible will 
certainly help in reducing the tension associated with ambivalence. However, that 
alone may not be sufficient for there is nothing stopping incompatible information 
from trickling in and reinstating ambivalence. The best strategy may involve two 
concurrent steps. First is the priming effect already described, that is. increasing 
accessibility of attitudinal elements consistent with the currently available 
information/situation. Second, there is a possibility for a converse effect operating on 
incongruent elements. One way to avoid the rise in consciousness of conflicting 
elements would be to actively inhibit activation of cognitive elements incompatible 
with the information being processed.
3.1 Conflict and Accessibility 
The data reviewed in the previous chapter suggest that ambivalent people are 
more strongly affected by the immediate situation (i.e. prime) than are non- 
ambivalent subjects. When witnessing a stigmatized person perform a negative act. 
ambivalent subjects tend to judge that person more negatively than a comparable non­
stigmatized person; when faced with a target performing a desirable act. ambivalent 
people tend to judge that person more positively than a non-stigmatized target. This 
suggests that what is at play may be more than a typical priming effect and although
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there is no evidence yet for an active suppression process in attitude research, 
evidence of inhibitory mechanisms in cognition (Anderson & Spellman, 1995; May, 
Kane, & Hasher, 1995; Milliken, Joordens. Merikle, & Seiffert, 1998; Tipper. 1985) 
suggest that it is indeed a possibility. Such mechanisms are believed to aid selection 
and retrieval of information from memory by limiting the cognitive search to mostly 
relevant items. For example, the quest for a particular piece of information may get 
quite messy if the activation were to spread not only to relevant elements but also to 
competing alternatives.
Anderson and Spellman (1995) argue that one of the functions of inhibitory 
processes is to increase both retrieval speed and accuracy by limiting the interfering 
effect of activated distractors. The activation of goal-relevant targets combined with 
the inhibition of competing distractors increases the probability that the desired target 
will be retrieved quickly while limiting the number of errors. Negative priming 
studies suggest that such a process takes place. These studies typically require 
participants to identify a target among a set of distractor stimuli. When a “to-be- 
ignored” stimulus is subsequently used as a target, participants usually show 
increased reaction time relative to neutral targets (Anderson & Spellman; May et al.. 
1995; Milliken et al., 1998, Tipper, 1985). Anderson and Spellman further revealed 
that the impairment is not limited to the distracting item itself but that the interference 
generalizes to stimuli that are merely similar (i.e. belonging to the same category, for 
example, red objects) to the original distractor. The role of inhibitory processes may 
therefore be to help current search (increasing both accuracy and processing speed) 
by lowering the activation level of competing/interfering responses (Anderson &
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Spellman, 1995) as well as by preventing recently rejected information from 
becoming re-activated (May et al., 1995).
A parallel process may play a role in the response amplification effect. 
Excitatory links may render cognitive representations that are compatible with the 
current situation more easily accessible (through spreading activation/priming), while 
inhibitory processes may serve to keep competing/incompatible elements from being 
activated (possibly sub-activated). The combination of these two processes would 
reduce the probability of conflicting thoughts being simultaneously activated, 
therefore allowing one to make a judgment based mostly on information consistent 
with the current context. The present suggestion is that a super-activation of 
compatible elements coupled with a sub-activation of incompatible elements may be 
a sensible strategy and possibly the process at play in the response amplification 
effect. One crucial condition for the viability o f this proposal is that attitudes be 
subject to accessibility manipulations. Since attitudes are best thought of as memory 
structures, processes that affect the ease of access of memory structures should 
similarly affect the structure of attitudes. This has in fact been shown to be the case.
3.1.1 Accessibility of Attitudes
The importance of attitudes as memory structures, especially their role in 
providing structure and significance to the world and in guiding decision-making, is a 
well-accepted notion. The sine qua non condition for attitudes to perform their 
function is that they be activated from memory. Fazio (1989) strongly argues that it is 
the level o f accessibility of an attitude that determines its power and functionality 
(also Bargh et al., 1992). Indeed, it is not sufficient for an attitude to be merely
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represented in memory. If it is to exert any kind of influence, an attitude must be also 
activated and used in judgment.
Some attitudes are “naturally” more accessible than others. Fazio et al. (1986; 
also Fazio, 1989; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) reported that some 
attitudes are spontaneously activated in the presence o f the attitude object. Attitudes 
rated as extreme (positive or negative) are typically responded to faster and are better 
recalled than weaker attitudes (Judd & Kulik. 1980; Pratnakis, 1989). Accessibility is. 
however, not a fixed property o f attitudes. A number of factors can affect ease of 
access, and therefore the likelihood that a given attitude will be used in subsequent 
judgment. It is generally assumed that whichever manipulations affect typical LTM 
structures (e.g. priming) will also affect the structure of attitudes (Judd. Drake. 
Downing, & Krosnick, 1991; Ostrom et al., 1994; Tourangeau et al., 1991).
For example, being repeatedly exposed to (or repeatedly expressing) a given 
attitude temporarily increases its accessibility (Downing et al., 1992; Fazio. 1989: 
Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983; Fiske & Taylor. 1991). Powell and Fazio (1984) showed 
that prior access to an attitude (through repeated expression) made subsequent 
attitudinal responses easier (operationalized as reaction time) regardless of the pre­
existing strength of the object-evaluation association. In addition to repetition 
priming, attitude accessibility can also be affected by semantic priming. For example. 
Fazio et al. (1986) demonstrated that classification of an adjective as positive or 
negative was faster when a congruent attitude object was used as a prime (e.g. war- 
bad). Other reports show that when two related judgments are made consecutively, 
responses are typically faster and more extreme on the second item than on the first
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item (Bargh et al., 1992, Fazio et al., 1986; Tourangeau & Rasinsky, 1988; 
Tourangeau et al., 1991).
Based on these findings, Judd et al. (1991) argue that activating a stored 
evaluation increases the likelihood of activation of other related (i.e. linked in 
memory) attitudes through a spreading activation process. This temporary increase in 
activation thus seems to affect both intensity (extremity of a response) and speed of 
processing (reaction time). One sensible possibility is that attitude intensity may 
partly be a function of ease of access. When judging an attitude object, individuals 
may pay attention to the ease with which the judgment is made and may interpret 
easy access as an intense affective reaction (Downing et al.. 1992; Jacoby. Woloshyn. 
& Kelley. 1989; Judd et al.. 1991: Ostrom et al.. 1994: Petty et al.. 1997). It thus 
seems clear that attitude accessibility can be momentarily modified by current events. 
Taken as a whole, these findings bring credence to the idea that ambivalent attitudes 
may be especially sensitive to such manipulations, especially when one considers the 
fact that conflicted attitude include elements along both the positive and negative 
dimensions.
3.2 Super-Activation and Sub-Activation 
The fact that attitudinal responses are affected by contextual and 
environmental circumstances suggests that the activation of attitudes is not a static 
process. Indeed, various factors exist that can affect which portion of the structure 
gets activated. Attitudes are generally construed as comprising many clusters, each 
cluster being further made up of a number o f arguments (Hass, 1981; Tourangeau et 
al., 1991). It is the combination of an individual's reactions to these elemental
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components that gives an overall evaluation of that person’s attitude and of the 
clusters that are part of this attitude. Drawing an analogy from the network model 
literature, such as McClelland and Rummelhart’s (1985; also Rummelhart, 
McClelland, & the PDP Research Group, 1986) distributed model o f memory, an 
attitude may be thought of as a set o f interconnected nodes. Each node or unit has a 
starting activation level and is connected to many other nodes through a set of 
weighted links. The starting activation level of any given node is an indication of how 
accessible that particular node is. Possibly, elements important in determining a 
person’s attitude would possess higher activation values than elements that are less 
psychologically salient.
Additionally, the activation signals traveling through the network are 
modulated by weights associated with the inter-element connections. Thus, a signal 
may be amplified or weakened to varying degrees depending on the nature o f the 
connections between units. Since each element is connected to (and receives input 
from) many other units, its resulting activation level will be the result of the node's 
pre-existing activation combined with the weighted sum of the activation signals 
received from its connected nodes. The set of weights therefore plays a role in setting 
an element’s activation level such that when the system is activated, the stronger 
(positive) weights would allow the corresponding elements to be among the first ones 
to reach threshold and thus be accessed. Procedures such as priming temporarily 
inflate the level of activation, resulting in easier access when the attitude object (or 
one of its connected elements) is (re)-introduced.
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It should be noted that the connection weights can also have negative values 
serving to inhibit activation in parts of the system. The link between units that are 
simultaneously active and that respond in the same way will tend to be positive in 
nature, while the connection between units that respond differently will tend to be 
weakened (i.e. negative) (McClelland & Rummelhart, 1985; Rummelhart et al.. 1986; 
Rummelhart & Norman, 1988). It has been proposed that incompatible elements 
might mutually inhibit one another whereas compatible concepts may be mutually 
excitatory (Rummelhart et al.. 1986). This further suggests the existence of both a 
priming (through excitatory connections) and an "anti-priming” (through inhibitory 
connections) effect (Ostrom et al.. 1994). The former is fairly common and 
unsurprising, but it may be somewhat harder to conceive of the latter.
Priming occurs when the activation of a concept spreads to neighboring units, 
thus making those compatible items more accessible. Anti-priming (also known as 
negative priming) can be observed when the links connecting two nodes are 
inhibitory. In such cases, activation of a concept might lead to reduced activation of a 
connected (but incompatible) node, hence rendering that second unit less accessible. 
For example, having recently accepted as true the statement "John is tall” (e.g. when 
John is surrounded by jockeys) would make it difficult to subsequently accept as true 
the statement "John is short” (e.g. if John is surrounded by basketball players). Those 
two statements are incompatible and cannot concurrently be held as true. Thus 
activation of the concept "John is tall” may very well lead to suppression of the belief 
that “John is short”, and conflict can thus be avoided. Let us further explore this 
process with a brief review of negative priming research.
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3.2.1 Negative Priming in Memory Research
Evidence supporting the existence of inhibitory mechanisms has shaken the 
traditional assumption that memory retrieval only involved the search for a target, 
possibly through activation of retrieval cues (Anderson & Spellman. 1995). Recent 
studies suggest that a more efficient kind of processing may actually be taking place 
in which long-term memory retrieval involves both enhanced processing of the 
desired information in conjunction with active inhibition of distractors interfering 
with information retrieval (see Anderson & Spellman; May et al.. 1995: Tipper.
1985). This process is parallel to the one believed to take place in selective attention 
which involves increased activation of relevant information along with suppression of 
irrelevant information (Milliken et al.. 1998).
Negative priming studies generally involve response to a target that has 
appeared as a distractor in previous trials. Participants typically show increased 
response latencies to previously rejected items. May et al. (1995) suggest that the 
representations of both target and distractor are activated but that the representation of 
the distractor is suppressed from response output. This suppression is believed to last 
for some time, leading to slower response times when a previously distracting item is 
later used as a target. It is further argued that one of the functions of inhibition is to 
prevent recently rejected items from becoming re-activated, such that goal-irrelevant 
information might not interfere with cognitive processing.
Anderson and Spellman's (1995) research suggests that a similar process is at 
play in memory retrieval. Subjects learned a set of category-exemplar pairs (such as 
“red-blood”, *‘red-fire”, “red-tomato”, etc.) and were at a later point (called retrieval
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practice) required to limit their answer to the category cue to only a subset of the 
learned exemplars (e.g. "blood” or "fire”). During retrieval practice, being presented 
with the category “red” activates a number of possible responses. Since only a subset 
o f those responses is allowed (i.e. "blood” and "fire” in the present example), a 
selection must be made. Anderson and Spellman believe that the competing (i.e. 
forbidden) items (e.g. 'tomato”) are inhibited and thus harder to recall at a later 
phase. It was found that any learned exemplar interfering with practice retrieval (i.e. 
anything red, other than "blood” or "fire”) had low recall rates regardless of the cue 
under which it was learned (e.g. "food-ketchup” or "food-strawberry” -  both "red” 
items -  had lower recall rates than “food-bread” or "food-crackers).
Thus, retrieval practice not only impaired the recall of items that were in 
direct competition (i.e. learned under the same category cue) with the practiced 
elements, but words that were merely similar (i.e. sharing features but learned under a 
different category) to the interfering competitors were also harder to access than 
neutral items (i.e. crackers or bread). It should be noted that this effect was still 
evident 20 minutes after the retrieval practice had taken place. Anderson and 
Spellman (1995) argue that memory retrieval may require active inhibition of 
competitors. Thus a truly efficient search may involve both increased activation of a 
target along with active suppression of competitors (Milliken et al., 1998).
This combined effect of excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms allows for more 
efficient information processing and better decision-making by highlighting the path 
to the appropriate response. Without such a system, one may see the concurrent 
activation of incompatible (competing) responses which would likely lead to general
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observed in ambivalence. When a person is in a state of ambivalence, his/her attitudes 
do not serve their guidance and categorization functions well anymore. Instead, they 
are likely to lead to tension, anxiety, and result in "agitated indecision*’ (Hass & 
Eisenstadt, 1993) once an individual is aware of having mixed feelings. The fact that 
inhibitory processes have been observed in studies of memory retrieval hints that a 
parallel process may be at play in the retrieval of attitudes as well. Possibly the 
activation of a concept inhibits activation of incompatible ones, making the latter less 
accessible and less likely to be used in subsequent attitude judgments (Ostrom et al..
1994).
3.2.2 Negative Priming in Ambivalence?
Where ambivalence is concerned, the starting point is an individual's 
awareness of an internal conflict regarding an object or event. The realization of 
possessing conflicting beliefs has been proposed to lead to negative affect (see Katz. 
1981; Hass et al., 1992), which in turn results in a drive to reduce conflict. Studies of 
ambivalence typically expose participants to information that (although one-sided) is 
relevant to the issue. Ambivalent individuals are believed to be particularly motivated 
to process this information since it may help resolve the conflict. In addition to being 
motivated to process this newly offered evidence, ambivalent people are presumably 
well equipped to handle and make sense of this information since they already have 
similar concepts represented in memory (Bell & Esses. 1997: Maio et al.. 1996). As 
one is processing this information, activation is likely to spread to compatible bits of 
knowledge, making them easier to access. This ease of access has been posited (Bell
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& Esses) to lead to the response amplification effect sometimes observed following 
exposure to one-sided attitudinal events.
Evidence from memory research (Anderson & Spellman. 1995; May et al..
1995) suggests that efficient memory retrieval involves both excitatory and inhibitory 
processes. Excitatory connections serve to search for relevant information while 
inhibitory links are believed to reduce the activation of conflicting elements. It does 
not seem too far-fetched to suggest that the operations of the attitude system may 
work in a analogous manner. Research in the field of attitudes has provided support 
for the existence of excitatory links (e.g. repetition priming, semantic priming, etc.). 
The operations of excitatory mechanisms can be called upon to account for part o f the 
amplification effect (through activation of compatible elements). However, if 
conflicting information were to enter consciousness during this process, conflict and 
its associated negative arousal could be re-established. An additional step can 
therefore be proposed. Since we argue that the prime motivation is to reduce conflict, 
decreasing the accessibility of incompatible elements is a desirable goal. The present 
suggestion is that inhibitory links also exist, such that elements conflicting with 
currently processed information should see their activation level lowered. If such is 
the case, conflicting concepts and beliefs should be less accessible. What we propose 
to test is whether the increased level of accessibility observed on compatible elements 
is accompanied by a parallel inhibition of interfering elements.
3.3 Concerns about the RAE 
The earlier review of ambivalence research has revealed that the response 
amplification effect is not very stable. Some have not found evidence of it and most
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
of those who have only reported moderate success. For instance, Hass et al. (1991) 
reported a significant polarization in judgment ratings in the negative direction only 
(i.e. failure condition), but have found a significant correlation between ambivalence 
scores and ratings in the positive context only (i.e. success condition). Before them. 
Gibbons et al. (1980) reported polarized ratings mostly in the favorable direction, 
with only one o f their four studies showing the effect in both the positive and 
negative directions. Similarly, Bell and Esses (1997) only reported findings of a 
relative form of the RAE. The data are therefore somewhat inconsistent but yet 
common enough to arouse interest. Even though polarization may not be as reliable as 
one would like, the circumstances under which it does occur share enough features to 
render it interesting. Anyone engaged in further studying the effect must therefore 
make sure that those characteristics (i.e. personal relevance, high experimental 
realism) are present in whichever situation is used.
The composition of the comparison groups used in previous studies is another 
possible contributor to the haziness surrounding the RAE. Many of the earlier studies 
(for e.g. Katz, 1981; Gibbons et al.. 1980; Linville & Jones, 1980) simply assumed 
ambivalent feelings to have been present, thus making any comparison across 
“degrees” of ambivalence impossible. In later studies (e.g. Bell & Esses, 1997; Katz 
& Hass, 1988; Hass et al.. 1991. 1992), the grouping into a single non-ambivalent 
category of what were possibly Anti- and Pro- individuals may have covered an 
important part o f the process involved in the amplification effect. For example, 
comparing the responses of, say, the Anti-group to those of the Ambivalent group 
would allow one to see whether the changes shown by ambivalent individuals are
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indeed more extreme than those shown by univalent participants. Before concluding 
that priming is the main factor involved (or that amplification is even taking place), 
one needs to make sure that ambivalent individuals are in fact more affected by the 
prime/context and that previous indication of an RAE was not a function of the non- 
ambivalent group's makeup.
3.4 Ambivalence. Accessibility, and the RAE: A Proposal 
The current research involved a number of steps. The specific aim was to 
explore the cognitive processes underlying the response amplification effect. Since 
one major goal is to avoid conflict, we proposed that the best strategy involves two 
simultaneous processes: increased access of compatible elements along with sub­
activation o f incompatible elements (this possibility is clearly supported by memory 
research). Given that judgment is based on whatever information is most available in 
memory, the activation/inhibition strategy would result in ratings that are polarized in 
the direction compatible with the current (i.e. activated) context. So far. the RAE has 
only been tested through judgment ratings but what is suggested here is that these 
polarized reactions are caused by a change in accessibility of specific attitudinal 
elements. Therefore, since the present focus is on the cognitive processes underlying 
the RAE, this research used a cognitively based measure o f accessibility (i.e. reaction 
time) in the place of judgment ratings.
The hope was to show that, after a one-sided prime, ambivalent subjects 
would show super-activation of elements compatible with the prime along with sub­
activation of elements incompatible with the prime. In a context devoid of ambivalent 
feelings, accessibility should not be as strongly affected by the priming condition and
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hence should more closely reflect subjects' pre-existing attitudes. After being 
exposed to a one-sided attitude prime, participants took part in a reaction time task 
(our measure o f accessibility) in which they were asked to classify items (compatible 
and incompatible with the prime) into categories. After the presentation of the prime, 
elements of the subjects’ attitude that are congruent with the prime should be 
activated and thus more accessible. Moreover, if the proposed inhibitory mechanisms 
are involved, incompatible elements of the attitude should be sub-activated. It was 
thus expected that, compared to non-ambivalent subjects, ambivalent individuals 
would show faster reaction times on compatible items and slower response times to 
incompatible items. Non-ambivalent participants were not expected to pay as much 
attention to the prime because they do not have as strong a need to search for 
information since their attitudes are already fairly stable. Thus the priming and anti­
priming processes should be taking place in all subjects but the resulting effects 
should be more apparent in the ambivalent than in the non-ambivalent individuals, 
given that the former have higher motivation to process the information and have 
both the positive and negative dimensions represented in the attitude structure.
Since the response amplification effect is known to occur under a rather 
restricted set of circumstances, we judged it best not to stray too far from existing 
research and thus concentrated our efforts on attitudes toward stigmatized groups. 
Following Hass et al.’s (1991) recommendations, participants were exposed to a 
prime that has both personal relevance and potentially important consequences for 
them. We also needed to ensure that, even though no direct contact with the target of
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ambivalence was possible, the situation would be personally involving for the 
participants.
3.4.1 Stigma and Personal Relevance: 09-11
Significant events sometimes take place that lead a certain group to be 
assigned a powerful stigma. On September 11th 2001. New Yorkers were stunned to 
see their majestic Twin Towers engulfed in flames after being successively hit by two 
commercial airliners, causing the death of more than three thousand people. Within 
minutes, a third plane crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC; a fourth plane, 
believed to be headed for the White House, crashed in a field outside of Pittsburgh. 
PA. The world stood in awe as these quintessential symbols of America crumbled, 
smoking up the blue morning sky. Within the span of a few hours, reports confirmed 
that members of a terrorist organization, known as Al-Qaeda, were behind the attacks.
The nineteen individuals responsible for hijacking the aircrafts were later 
identified as citizens from a number of Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia.
Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. These men were described as extremists, 
followers of a fundamentalist branch of the Islamic faith. Logic tells us that the 
individuals who committed those horrendous acts are not representative of Arabs or 
Muslims in general; yet, many people’s attitudes toward members of these particular 
groups have undoubtedly been changed, perhaps forever. Powerful, compelling 
events such as these can thus lead one group to be assigned an equally powerful 
stigma.
The data from the studies described here were collected at the Brooklyn 
College campus, which stands roughly 6 miles from where the World Trade Center
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once stood. Thus, in addition to being flooded by daily reports on the events, 
participants were also physically and psychologically close to the site. In the few days 
following the attacks, one simply needed to look out the window to see the lingering 
smoke and dust clouding up the sky. In the days and weeks following, the school 
buildings were evacuated on several occasions after bomb threats were received.
Thus, individuals taking part in these experiments were involved in the most personal 
of ways and were very well aware of the potential consequences of such threats.
Given the physical and psychological closeness, the primes used in the studies to 
follow are believed to meet the conditions of personal relevance and involvement.
3.4.2 The Conflict: Be Safe or Be Fair?
In the weeks following that fateful day, U.S. President George W. Bush and 
New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani urged the American public to be both vigilant, 
yet tolerant. The American people were encouraged to keep an eye open for 
suspicious activity while warding off ostracism based on ethnic or religious 
affiliation. In the mind of many U.S. residents. Middle Easterners and Muslims had 
suddenly become a threat to both national and personal safety. Yet. as it openly 
encouraged tolerance, the government had taken unprecedented action to ensure 
safety. As a result of these drastic measures potential criminal acts might have been 
prevented but at the same time many irreproachable individuals had also been 
arrested and jailed simply based on their ethnic background. For instance, a medical 
student o f Middle Eastern origin was arrested and jailed after it was reported that he 
had purchased five plane tickets for a transnational flight. The tickets in question 
were purchased for the man, his wife, and their three children. The purchase had
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raised a red flag since all five family members shared their last name with two of the 
hijackers. Situations like these have created an inherent conflict between the desire to 
feel safe (i.e. vigilant) and the desire to appear fair and non-prejudiced (i.e. showing 
tolerance).
One’s wish for safety may lead one to interpret an innocent situation as 
threatening, whereas one’s endorsement of egalitarian values may lead one to feel 
guilty or uncomfortable about making such an interpretation. Situations o f this kind 
are perfect examples of what ambivalent feelings are all about. We are in the presence 
of a compelling stigma, accompanied by intense personal relevance, especially in the 
heart of New York City where police presence and security checks act as constant 
reminders that life is not the same as it used to be. Anecdotally, many individuals 
have reported being aware of their conflicted feelings when in the presence o f Arab or 
Muslim men, finding themselves both anxious and uncomfortable with their own 
anxiety, knowing full well that it is based on their newfound negative attitude.
3.5 Description of the Research 
In the present experiments, participants were exposed to vivid vignettes 
designed to uncover the latent conflict (i.e. concern for both fairness and safety) and 
were asked to report the degree of ambivalence experienced. After having obtained 
subjects’ ambivalence score, accessibility o f fairness and safety concerns were 
assessed by measuring participants’ reaction times to words associated with either 
issue (e.g. threat, tolerant, etc.). Subjects were split into 3 groups according to their 
dominant attitude (Ambivalent, Safety-, or Fairness-oriented). For ease of comparison
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
with previous studies, we will also refer to the safety-oriented group as "Anti” and to 
the fairness-oriented individuals as “Pro”.
This grouping of subjects as Safe (Anti), Fair (Pro), or Ambivalent represents 
one major difference between the proposed research and existing studies. Most of the 
previous research has not used a measure of ambivalence but has rather assumed 
conflicted feelings to be present (for instance. Gibbons et al., 1980; Linville & Jones, 
1980; Hass et al., 1991). In some cases, ambivalence was measured but the analyses 
typically compared the responses of ambivalent subjects to those of “non-ambivalent” 
participants, thus leaving open the question of how Pro and Anti subjects may differ 
from one another and from the ambivalent group. This extra comparison may be 
especially important for studying the underpinnings of the response amplification 
effect.
3.5.1 New Information Sought in this Research
Previous studies looking at judgment ratings of stigmatized people reported 
that ambivalent individuals show a greater difference across situations than do non- 
ambivalent participants (e.g. Hass et al. 1991: Bell & Esses. 1997). Since Pro and 
Anti subjects were combined as one “non-ambivalent” group, there is the possibility 
that combining Pro and Anti participants* responses may have masked a more 
complex pattern. It is possible that these two subgroups* responses have moderated 
one another, thus leading to a rather restrained judgment for that group. For instance, 
in a “pro” condition, Pro subjects may see their judgment amplified whereas the Anti 
subjects* rating may not be so greatly affected, thus averaging to an overall moderate 
change in rating for the non-ambivalent group.
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The ambivalent group, however, is composed of participants who always 
agree (to some extent) with the context, regardless of its direction (pro or anti), and 
may be affected under both types of circumstances. This may be what is leading to a 
seemingly greater change in attitude when compared to the reactions of non- 
ambivalent participants. A more robust test of the RAE may involve comparing the 
responses of ambivalent subjects to those of univalent subjects on words compatible 
with the latter's attitude (i.e. compare the ambivalent group to the Fair group on the 
fair words and compare the ambivalent group to the Safe group on the safe words). 
This comparison would allow us to ensure that ambivalent people's change in access 
goes above and beyond the change shown by univalent subjects who also endorse the 
attitude.
In addition to the main priming study, a control condition was included in this 
research. Previous reports on attitude accessibility (Fazio et al.. 1986; Fazio. 1989) 
show that strongly held attitudes tend to be highly accessible. In the case of 
ambivalence, it has been assumed that, since both dimensions are endorsed, both 
positive (pro/fair) and negative (anti/safe) attitudinal elements should be easily 
accessible to ambivalent individuals. This presumption has, however, never (to our 
knowledge) been directly tested. It is therefore judged important to gather information 
about accessibility in a neutral state because there are a number of possible 
mechanisms that could be involved in the RAE.
3.5.2 Possible Cognitive Processes
The main proposal, suggesting that a combination of inhibition and super­
activation underlies the amplification effect, rests on the belief that both dimensions
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of the attitude are easily accessible in a neutral context. However, any single one of 
the processes (inhibition or super-activation) may be sufficient for the occurrence of 
the polarized reactions. It could be that, following a prime, the incompatible 
dimension gets inhibited, thus leading ambivalent subjects to rely on only one 
dimension in judgment. If so, ambivalents' behavior would be similar to the behavior 
of univalent (and compatible) subjects. That is, in a Fair condition, ambivalent 
subjects may react just like Fair subjects; in a Safe condition, the ambivalent group 
may react just like the Safe group. Conversely, it is also conceivable that no inhibition 
is taking place and that the polarized responses result from increased accessibility of 
(and thus increased reliance on) compatible thoughts following priming.
The addition of a neutral condition allowed us to obtain a baseline measure of 
accessibility and further assurance that underlying attitudes are indeed reflected in the 
reaction time response pattern. Again, given the general belief that accessibility and 
endorsement go hand in hand, it was presumed that, at rest, ambivalent people would 
show reaction times similar to Fair individuals on the fair items and similar to Safe 
individuals on the safe items. Then again, there remains the intriguing possibility that 
the conflicting elements inhibit one another at rest. If so. ambivalent subjects should 
show lower accessibility than non-ambivalent participants across the board and the 
RAE may be due to a disengagement of some inhibitory mechanism in lieu of the 
proposed process. The addition of a three way split (Pro. Anti, and Ambivalent 
subjects) and of a neutral condition should allow us to consider these alternatives. The 
present research thus comprises two experiments, each including three sections: 
personality survey, reactions to current events, and information processing task.
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3.5.3 The First Experiment
In Experiment 1, we explored the link between dominant attitude and chronic 
accessibility of safety and fairness concerns, without making any one dimension more 
important than the other. Participants first completed a series of personality scales, 
followed by exposure to two short narratives (“Reactions to Current Events”). The 
two vignettes were designed to emphasize the latent conflict, making both safety and 
fairness concerns equally salient. The last section of the experiment had the 
participants engage in a lexical decision task (“Information Processing Task”), which 
would allow assessment of baseline measures of accessibility of the two dimensions. 
In addition, individuals' reactions to the narratives were collected and used to 
compute overall attitudes and ambivalence scores. These scores were also relied on to 
verify whether or not response latencies reflect subjects' attitudes.
3.5.4 The Second Experiment
In the actual experimental session (Experiment 2). similar procedures were 
used with participants first completing a personality survey, followed by presentation 
of the two vignettes. As in Experiment 1. subjects' ambivalence level was assessed 
from their reported reactions to the narratives. For the second experiment, an 
additional step was incorporated in the “Reactions to Current Events” segment. 
Participants were asked to read a third text (presented as a newspaper article in order 
to enhance the realism of the situation) emphasizing either the safety or fairness 
dimension, and thus acting as a prime. Subsequently, the participants were requested 
to categorize words associated with either Fairness (e.g. unfair, tolerant) or Safety 
(e.g. risk, threat). It was expected that, compared to non-ambivalent individuals.
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ambivalent subjects would show slower reaction times (i.e. inhibition) to words 
associated with the value dimension incompatible with the prime. For instance, after a 
Safety-oriented prime, ambivalent subjects were expected to show inhibition when 
categorizing words associated with Fairness and under a Fairness-oriented prime, 
ambivalent subjects should show inhibition to words related to Safety.
The performance of non-ambivalent subjects should reflect their dominant 
attitude and should not be as strongly affected by the prime as their ambivalent 
counterparts. For example, Fairness-oriented participants should respond faster to 
words linked to fairness and slower to those associated with the safety, regardless of 
prime. Conversely, subjects with a Safety focus should show faster reaction times to 
Safety stimuli than to Fairness stimuli (regardless of priming condition). The resulting 
design thus included two between-subjects manipulation: Safety or Fairness prime 
and subjects’ dominant attitude -Pro. Anti, or Ambivalent- (individual difference).
The words associated with the two values represent an additional (within-subjects) 
manipulation.
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Chapter 4: Experiment 1, Dominant Attitude and Accessibility
In this experiment, we explored the link between dominant attitude and 
chronic accessibility o f safety and tolerance concerns. Participants first completed a 
series of personality scales, followed by exposure to two short narratives ("Reactions 
to Current Events”). The two vignettes were designed to emphasize the latent conflict, 
thus making both dimensions equally salient. In the last section of the experiment, 
participants engaged in a lexical decision task ("information processing task”), which 
allowed assessment o f baseline measures of accessibility of the two dimensions. In 
addition, individuals' reactions to the narratives were collected and used to compute 
overall ambivalence scores. These scores were relied on to verify whether response 
latencies adequately reflect subjects' attitudes.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Sixty-nine Brooklyn College undergraduates participated in this experiment 
for partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology requirement. Over 90% of the 
participants were under the age of 26 (81% between 16 and 20 years of age). The 
sample tested included 45 women (65.2% of the sample) and 24 men (34.8%). 
Roughly 77% of the participants reported English as their best language (of those 
66.7% had English as their first language). Other information regarding religion and 
ethnicity is presented in Table 4.1.
4.1.2 Materials
Four Computers with color monitors equipped with Superlab software & 6- 
button response box (Cedrus Corporation. 1997). The Personality survey includes a
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Aze n Percentaze o f  Sample
16 to 20 56 81.2
21 to 25 7 10.1
26 to 30 2 2.9
31 to 35 2 2.9
36 to 40 1 1.4
40 a n d  u d 1 1.4
Total 69 100
Table 4.1b: Ethnicitv 
Ethnic Backzround n Percent
Asian- (American) 15 21.7
African- (American) 5 7.2
Arab- (American) I 1.4
East Indian 1 1.4
Latino 5 7.2
West Indian 8 11.6
White/Caucasian 27 39.1
Other 7 10.1
Total 69 100
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Table 4.1c: Participants’ Religious Affiliation
Religion__________________n___________ Percentage o f  Sample
Atheist 0 0
Buddhist I 1.4
Christian 10 14.5
Hindu * 4.3
Islamic 1 1.4
Jewish/non-Orthodox 8 11.6
Jewish/Orthodox 9 13.0
None 13 18.8
Other 24 34.8
Total 69 100
Table 4. Id: Degree of Religiosity
How religious are vou? n Percentage
Not at all/in name only 11 15.9
Slightly 15 21.7
Moderately 15 21.7
Quite a bit 16 23.2
Extremely 9 13
Completely 3 4.3
Total 69 100
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Table 4.le: Participants’ subway experience
How often do you take the subway?________n___________ Percent
Less than once a year 4 5.8
Once or twice a year 6 8.7
Once every couple of months 7 10.1
Once or twice a month 11 15.9
Once a week 14 20.3
Three or more times a week 27 39.1
Total 69 100
How often do vou flv? N Percent
Never flown before 8 11.6
Less than once a year 37 53.6
About once a year 12 17.4
Two to three times a year 9 13
Four to six times a year 2 2.9
Six or more times a vear 1 1
Total 69 100
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neuroticism scale (McCrae & Costa, 1991 -  see Appendix A), the short form of the 
need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984 -  see Appendix B), and a 
need for closure scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1996 -  see Appendix C). Two brief 
stories describing ambiguous situations, one aboard a plane and one on a subway 
platform. Each vignette had a set of follow-up questions associated with it (see 
appendices D and E for the vignettes and their linked questions). A list o f 74 items, 
including 10 words associated with fairness, 10 associated with safety. 20 neutral 
words matched with the safety and fairness words for length (number of syllables) 
and frequency (obtained from Kucera & Francis. 1967). and 34 pronounceable non­
words constructed by changing 1 or 2 letters from real words (also matched for 
length- see Appendix F). The materials also include a demographics questionnaire 
(see Appendix G).
4.1.2.1 Ambivalence index
Since ambivalence is defined as the simultaneous activation of opposing 
drives (bivalent tension), it is important to have a measure that reflects this property. 
The method used to quantify ambivalence must therefore take into consideration the 
relative strength of the two opposing forces (i.e. pro/fair and anti/safe). Hass and 
Eisenstadt (1993) have identified the properties that an adequate ambivalence 
measure should have and have tested a number of indexes in an effort to identify 
which o f the many available ones best fits with the theoretical guidelines.
The basic principle is that the measured degree of ambivalence should be a 
function of both the extremity and similarity of the component scores. The particular 
features that were looked for are as follows (for a detailed account, see Hass &
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
Eisenstadt, 1993): 1) While holding similarity (between Pro and Anti scores) 
constant, ambivalence should increase along with extremity, that is. as Pro and Anti 
scores increase, so should ambivalence. 2) For a given level of extremity, 
ambivalence should heighten as a function of similarity, thus the more similar the 
scores on the Pro and Anti components of the attitude are. the higher the ambivalence 
should be. Given these criteria, it was concluded that the best available measure can 
be formulated as such: ambivalence = W2/S. where "W” represents the score on the 
weaker of the two component scores and ”S '\ the stronger of the two component 
scores. This measure is therefore the one that will be used to assess ambivalence in 
the present research.
4.1.3 Procedure
Each session included a maximum of four participants, each o f which was 
assigned to an individual computer workstation after having received general verbal 
instructions. Upon entering the laboratory, the subjects were informed that the 
experiment was testing how different aspects of personality affect how people 
interpret different situations. In line with this information, they were first asked to 
complete a series of personality scales (neuroticism. need for closure, and need for 
cognition, presented in random order). Even though these scales were not associated 
with any of the hypotheses, they were included as part of the cover story and also as 
elements to be completed as the subjects became comfortable with the experimental 
setting. The neuroticism scale consists of 20 questions that were to be answered by 
responding "yes” or "no’* (e.g. "Do you often feel life is very dull?”, the complete 
scale is available in appendix A). For the other two scales, participants indicated the
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degree to which each statement was representative of them using a six-point scale (1= 
not at all like me, 6= very much like me). The need for closure scale is made up of 24 
items, categorized along the following dimensions: preference for order and structure, 
preference for predictability, decisiveness, discomfort with ambiguity, and 
shortsightedness (appendix C). The short version of the need for cognition includes 
18 statements, such as “I enjoy solving problems'’ (appendix B). Each scale was 
presented in random order, one statement at a time. Subjects initiated the presentation 
of each statement by pressing a key and also indicated their answer by hitting a key 
on the response box. Participants were not given any time limit for answering the 
statements.
After completing the personality survey, participants took part in the 
"Reactions to Current Events” section. They were instructed to read carefully two 
brief stories “related to the recent terrorist attacks”. Subjects were instructed to 
imagine themselves as part of the scene described in the vignettes. They were told to 
picture themselves as the main character in the story and to imagine it as vividly as 
possible. One story depicted two men (believed to be Muslims) getting on a plane and 
behaving in a way that could be interpreted as suspicious. The other narrative 
described a group of men (who “may be speaking Arabic") on a subway platform, 
also behaving in a manner that can be viewed as threatening. The stories were 
purposely built to be somewhat ambiguous, thus allowing for participants to come up 
with their own interpretation. In both stories, issues of fairness and safety were 
mentioned with the main character thinking that the men's behavior was suspicious 
but that he/she may be overreacting and being unnecessarily judgmental. Each of the
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vignettes appeared in a black frame (on two successive screens) and was written in 
Arial font. The two stories appeared in random order and each was followed by a set 
of seven questions designed to assess the degree of conflict experienced by the 
participant.
Three questions probed the safety concerns of the subjects (e.g. “How 
suspicious of the men would you be?”), with each of those being followed by a 
question probing possible fairness concerns (e.g. “How prejudiced would you feel 
about being suspicious of the men?”). One last question asked subjects to indicate the 
degree to which they experience “conflict from feeling both nervous and intolerant" 
toward the men. Each of those questions was to be answered on a 6-point scale ( I = 
not at all, 6= extremely). As in part I. progress through section II was self-paced and 
included no time limit for responses.
The third segment of the experiment had subjects engage in a lexical decision 
task consisting of 74 letter strings, presented one at a time. The task was to judge 
whether each presented item was a word or not. The subjects were instructed to 
answer as quickly as possible while keeping errors to a minimum. Thirty-four of the 
74 trials were nonwords, 40 are real words (10 safety related. 10 fairness related. 20 
neutral), all presented randomly. Before each trial, participants viewed a prompt 
instructing them to initiate the trial by pressing a key, along with a reminder of the 
response choices (“press I for word, 2 for nonword”). Two hundred and fifty 
milliseconds after the key press, a fixation cross (“+”) appeared in the center of the 
screen for 500 milliseconds. An item immediately replaced the fixation cross and 
remained on the screen for a maximum of 3000 ms. Subjects indicated their response
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by pressing the appropriate key on the button box, using their dominant hand, 
pressing the number 1 key to indicate “word” and the number 2 key for "nonword" 
responses. Failure to respond within the 3-second time frame resulted in an incorrect 
response. Feedback was offered after each response. After each correct answer, the 
words “correct response” appeared in blue for 750ms whereas the words "wrong 
response” (or 'timed out”) appeared in red for 1500ms after incorrect responses. The 
longer duration for the incorrect feedback was meant to give subjects extra motivation 
to pay close attention to the stimuli and respond within the allotted time limit. 
Demographic information was also collected from all subjects, including age. gender, 
ethnic and religious background as well as frequency of flying and subway riding.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Expectations
Research reported by Bargh et al. (1992). Fazio (1989). Judd and Kulik 
(1980), and Pratnakis (1989) (to mention a few) has shown that strong attitudes are 
more easily accessible than those that aren't as strongly held. It is through this high 
degree of accessibility that attitudes perform their categorization function. Extreme 
attitudes are activated automatically and objects related to such attitudes tend to be 
responded to and to be categorized relatively fast. In this study, it was expected that 
participants with a strong Safety orientation would be able to categorize words related 
to safety fairly quickly and that participants with a strong Fairness orientation would 
perform likewise on words related to fairness. The predictions for ambivalent subjects 
were, however, not so clear. Since ambivalent individuals have extreme attitudes on 
both the Fairness and Safety dimensions, they should be able to quickly process
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information related to both orientations. Yet, because of the inherent conflict, it is 
possible that the two dimensions inhibit one another, thus leading to slower overall 
reactions for ambivalent people.
The goal of this study was to see if  there is a correspondence between reported 
attitudes and measured accessibility. If such a link exists, it was expected that 
individuals with a “Fair” attitude would show faster reaction times than subjects with 
a “Safe” attitude on the fairness-oriented words. On the safety-oriented words, the 
Safety group should show faster reaction times than the Fairness group. Given that 
they strongly endorse both dimensions, ambivalent participants were expected to be 
quick on both types of words, yet the possibility also exists that the two dimensions 
could muffle each other, leading to slower reaction times overall for the ambivalent 
group.
4.2.2 Attitude Assessment
4.2.2.1 Fairness and safety scores
Both the overall Fairness and Safety scores are based on participants' 
responses to six questions (three from each of the fairness and safety dimensions 
following each of the two vignettes). The Pearson correlations between the six 
Fairness items ranged from .08 to .55. with 11 of the 15 pairs (ranging from .24 to 
.55) being correlated at the .05 level or above. Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the 
Fairness scale was .76. The correlations between the six Safety items ranged from 
-.21 to .84. Apart from the single negative correlation (non-significant) all other pairs 
(from .35 to .84) were correlated at the .01 level. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for the 
Safety scale was .89.
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A principal components analysis done on all 12 items resulted in a four-factor 
solution, accounting for 78% of the variance. Based on a loading criterion of .50 and 
above, all the Safety items loaded on only one factor (factor I), and five of the six 
Fairness items loaded on factor 2. The only exception loaded negatively on factor 4 
(this item had a loading o f .44 on factor 2). The correlation between total Fairness and 
Safety score is .17, p  = .156, further indicating that the two dimensions are essentially 
unrelated, which is desirable for the present purposes. The fact that the two 
dimensions are independent allows for individuals to be scoring high on only one of 
them (i.e. Fairness- or Safety-oriented), score high on both (i.e. ambivalent), or low- 
on both (see Cacioppo & Bemtson, 1994; Hass & Eisenstadt. 1993).
For each of the vignettes, we summed the responses to the set of six questions 
(three assessing safety concerns and three assessing fairness concerns) to obtain 
Fairness and Safety scores associated with each vignette. Pearson correlations on 
safety and fairness scores between the two vignettes were significant at the .01 level 
(.54 and .41. respectively). Overall Fairness and Safety attitude scores were obtained 
by summing participants' responses to the six questions associated with each 
dimension (three safety and three fairness questions associated with each of the two 
vignettes). Since each response is based on a six-point scale, the minimum score is 6 
and the maximum score is 36. The mean Fairness score was A/= 16.81 (SD = 6.12. 
range 6-31), the mean Safety score was M  = 22.28 (SD = 7.41, range 6-36).
4.2.2.2 Assessing dominant attitude and ambivalence level
Ambivalence scores were obtained for each participant by inserting their mean 
Safety and mean Fairness scores in the Ambivalence index described by Hass and
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Eisenstadt (1993). Thus, the formula ambivalence = W2/S  (where W represents the 
score on the weaker of the two component scores and S. the stronger of the two 
component scores) was used to assess ambivalence. Given that the minimum and 
maximum scores (6 and 36 respectively) on the Fairness and Safety Dimensions, 
possible ambivalence scores range from I to 36. The mean ambivalence score 
obtained in this study was M  = 11.75 (SD = 6.59, range 1 to 28.03).
In addition to the safety and fairness questions that followed each vignette, 
participants were also asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced 
"conflict from feeling both nervous and intolerant” toward Arabs/Muslims. The 
Pearson correlation on reported conflict between the two vignettes was r = .40. p < 
.01. The sum of the responses to these two questions (one after each of the vignettes) 
represents what we will refer to as the "conflict" index (to distinguish it from the 
ambivalence index reported earlier). The possible scores on the conflict index range 
from 2 (minimum conflict -  "not at all conflicted”) to 12 (maximum conflict -  
"extremely conflicted”). The mean conflict score was M=  5.9 (SD = 2.6. range 2 to 
12). The correlation between the self-reported conflict index and assessed level of 
ambivalence index was significant; r = .46. < .001.
Participants scoring in the top 40% on the ambivalence index (ambivalence 
score ranging from 14.06 to 36) were classified as ambivalent, those in the bottom 
60% (ambivalence score ranged from 1 to 13.79) were classified as either fair or safe, 
according to which o f the Fairness or Safety score was highest. Based on these 
criteria, 28 individuals fell in the “ambivalent” group, 33 in the "safe” group, and 
only 8 were classified as "fair”. The mean Safety score was M — 23.14 (SD = 5.76)
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for the ambivalent group, M  = 24.18 (SD = 7.1) for the safe group, and M  = 11.38 
(SD = 4.41) for the fair group. The mean Fairness scores were M=  21.21 (SD = 4.09). 
A/= 12.58 (SD = 4.47), and A/= 18.88 (SD = 6.40) for the ambivalent, safe, and fair 
groups, respectively. Safety and Fairness attitude scores are also represented 
graphically in Figure 4.1.
4.2.3 Accessibility and Attitude
The main goal of this study is to explore the link between attitude and 
accessibility of elements of the said attitude. Level of accessibility is assessed via the 
reactions times obtained in the lexical decision task. Participants were presented with 
words associated with both attitude dimensions, as well as neutral words and 
nonwords. Previous research (e.g. Bargh et al.. 1992. Fazio. 1989) has shown a link to 
exist between attitude and accessibility. We thus expected individuals in the Fairness 
group to show faster reaction times then participants in the Safety group on the 
fairness-related words. On the safety-related words, the opposite pattern was 
predicted, with the Safety oriented group expected to respond faster than the Fairness 
group. Yet. our main interest is in the reactions of ambivalent individuals. It is 
possible that they would be relatively fast on both dimensions since both fairness and 
safety concerns are endorsed. However, the possibility also exists that, given the 
inherent conflict, the two dimensions inhibit each other, thus leading to lowered 
accessibility and overall slower reaction times for the ambivalent group. Reactions to 
words from both categories (fairness and safety) were analyzed separately. Data 
reported here are based on correct responses only.
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Figure 4.1: Mean Fairness and Safety Scores bv Dominant Attitude
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4.2.3.1 Fairness words
The mean reaction time (RT) on the fair words was M=  661.32 msec (SD = 
169.06) for the Fairness group (n = 8); for the Safety group (n = 33). the mean RT 
was M  = 714.01 msec (SD = 178.01); and the Ambivalent group (n = 28) had a mean 
RT M = 761.31msec (SD = 177.00). Overall accuracy was similar across groups, with 
the Fair group showing an average accuracy of 92.5% (SD = 11.65) while the Safety 
and Ambivalent groups group averaged 89.39% correct (SD = 10.88) and 88.57% (SD 
= 11.77), respectively. No significant differences in accuracy were found (F <I). 
Overall reaction times and accuracy rates, including the above along with data for 
neutral words (matched for length and frequency with the fairness-related words) and 
nonwords are reported in Tables 4.2 (reaction times) and 4.3 (accuracy). A one-way 
ANOVA was conducted and revealed no significant difference in reaction time across 
the three groups, F  (2.66) = 1.17./? = .32. Given the non-significance of the overall 
F, none of the intended pair-wise comparisons were pursued. Given the high degree 
of variability in the data, logarithmic transformations were applied but resulted in 
equally inconclusive results. F (2, 66) = 1.43./? = .25.
For the sake of comparison with previous ambivalence studies (and given the 
limited number of subjects in the fair group), data from the Fairness and Safety 
groups were combined into a “non-ambivalent” group. The mean RT obtained was \ f  
= 703.73 (SD = 175.50) for the non-ambivalent. Results of the independent t-test 
(comparing the Ambivalent and newly created Non-ambivalent groups) did not reveal 
any difference, t (67) = 1.334, p  = .19. We can thus safely conclude that no 
differences in accessibility level exist between the groups.
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Table 4.2 Mean Reaction Times (msec) bv Word Type and Dominant Attitude
Dominant Attitude
Ambivalent Fair Safe Total
n = 28 n = 8 II n = 69
Wordtype
Fair RT 761.31 661.32 714.01 727.10
SD (177.00) (169.06) (178.01) (177.11)
Control-Fair RT 779.92 638.70 756.57 752.38
SD (165.01) (119.57) (217.75) (190.89)
Safe RT 733.27 615.53 690.06 698.95
SD (156.02) (105.63) (173.82) (162.40)
Control-Safe RT 719.70 636.97 692.06 696.89
SD (136.65) (111.74) (170.92) (151.97)
Nonwords RT 841.32 717.60 799.14 698.95
SD (143.54) (152.05) (180.90) (162.40)
Note: Control-Fair words are matched for length and frequency with the Fair words. 
Control-Safe words are matched for length and frequency with the Safe words.
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Table 4.3 Mean Accuracy (percent correct) bv Word Tvpe and Dominant Attitude
Dominant Attitude
Ambivalent Fair Safe Total
n = 28 n = 8 n = 33 n = 69
Wordtype
Fair Acc
SD
88.57
(11.77)
92.5
(11.65)
89.39
(10.88)
89.42
(11.23)
Control-Fair Acc 86.43 92.5 88.18 87.97
SD (14.20) (10.35) (13.34) (13.35)
Safe Acc 88.93 86.25 87.27 87.83
SD (9.56) (15.98) (11.53) (11.23)
Control-Safe Acc 93.57 93.75 93.64 93.62
SD (11.29) (10.61) (93.64) (13.58)
Nonwords Acc 82.04 80.51 84.58 83.08
SD (14.10) (18.46) (12.01) (13.58)
Note: Control-Fair words are matched for length and frequency with the Fair words; 
Control-Safe words are matched for length and frequency with the Safe words. The 
notation “Acc” represents the percentage of correct responses for each of the word 
categories.
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4.2.3.2 Safety words
The Safety-oriented group (n = 33) had a mean reaction of M=  690.06 msec 
(SD = 173.82) on safety-related words. The fair group (n = 8) averaged M=  615.53 
msec (SD = 105.63) and the ambivalent group’s (n = 28) mean RT was M  -  733.27 
(SD = 156.02). Accuracy rates for the Safety words were also consistent across 
groups: the Safe group’s mean accuracy was 87.37% correct (SD = 11.53), the Fair 
group was correct 86.25% of the time (SD = 15.98) and the Ambivalent groups 
averaged 88.93% correct (SD = 9.56). These accuracy rates did not significantly 
differ across groups (F < 1). These data are presented in Table 4.2 (reaction times) 
and 4.3 (accuracy) along with the results for fair words, nonwords and control words 
(neutral words matched for length and frequency with the safety words).
Results of the one-way ANOVA showed that no significant differences in 
reaction times existed between the groups, F  (2,66) = 1.77. p  = .18. Planned 
contrasts revealed a marginally significant difference between the Ambivalent and 
Fair group, t (66) = 1.83. p  = .07. with the ambivalent group showing slower RTs than 
the Fair group. If we assume that endorsement of a value leads to higher accessibility, 
this finding is the opposite of what would be expected. No other comparisons were 
significant. An ANOVA performed on the log transformations was similarly 
unsuccessful. F  (2, 66) = 2.32. p = . 11. Figure 4.2 represents a graph of mean reaction 
times (for both safety and fairness words) by dominant attitude.
Combining the reactions times from the Fair and Safe group to create a non- 
ambivalent group resulted in a mean RT of M=  675.53 msec (SD = 164. 37). Results
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Figure 4.2: Mean Reaction Time bv Word Type and Dominant Attitude
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from the t-test comparing the ambivalent (M= 733.27 msec, SD = 156.02) to the non- 
ambivalent group were not significant, t (67) = 1.46, p  = . 15
4.2.3.3 Correlational data
Given the evident lack of relationship between the dominant attitude and 
accessibility, the author started wondering whether the absence of an effect might be 
due to the way in which the groups were created. Perhaps the Safe and Fair groups' 
attitudes were not extreme enough to be associated with easier access of compatible 
concepts. In order to get a more general view of the accessibility notion, correlational 
data were also obtained. If ease of access is at all related to dominant attitude, we 
should at least find a negative correlation between strength of attitude and response 
latency, that is, the more extreme one's attitude, the faster the RT should be to related 
items. The Pearson correlation between the fairness scores and mean reaction time on 
the fairness words was r  = .001. p  = .994. suggesting that there exists no relation 
between these two variables. The correlation between safety scores and mean RT on 
safety words was r = -. 121. p  = .318. which is only slightly less troublesome.
Worse yet, further analyses revealed that not one of the ten words' 
accessibility levels was associated with attitude strength. Correlations between level 
of fairness and each of the 10 fairness words revealed no relationship even close to 
significance; correlations between safety score and each one o f the 10 safety words 
resulted in an equally disturbing pattern of results (see Table 4.4 for complete 
results).
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Table 4.4: Correlations between Faimess/Safetv Scores and Related Words
Fairness Score________________________ Safety Score
Fair words r p Safe words r P
equal -.047 .711 aggress -.232 .130
justice .008 .953 fear -.073 .555
unfair .053 .674 risk .041 .742
tolerant -.032 .804 threat -.024 .850
decent -.025 .847 alert -.092 .478
bigot -.081 .584 danger .183 .135
racist .024 .860 safety -.136 .280
prejudice -.105 .413 terrorist -.195 .117
biased .067 .594 peril -.008 .961
wrong -.018 .889 violent -.162 .200
Note: The words listed represent to two categories of items that were used in the 
lexical decision task
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4.3 Discussion
4.3.1 Accessibility
This study did not produce the expected results. No link was found between 
dominant attitude and accessibility. Fazio (1989) reports that accessibility is a 
function of the strength of the attitudes and that attitudes that are not strong will not 
elicit automatic activation of relevant concepts. It is therefore possible that our 
participants’ attitudes toward fairness and safety were not quite strong enough to lead 
to the high degree of accessibility expected.
Also, to some degree, the attitudes studied in this research were ad-hoc 
attitudes, i.e. they might have been created on the spot and may not have been an 
inherent part of participants' existing attitude system. In a way, our sample was 
forced to ponder these issues perhaps with more insistence than is found outside the 
laboratory. The point is not that Fairness and Safety concerns do not exist -  they 
undoubtedly do- but their formation may be either too recent or too constrained to a 
particular context to affect accessibility of more general issues. We assessed attitudes 
specifically in the context o f the September 11th events, yet measured participants' 
reaction times to words presented in isolation, that is. without the help of a supporting 
framework. If what are here referred to as ‘‘safety’* and ‘‘fairness" words are 
processed outside of context, participants may have simply recognized them as 
“word” or "nonword” without processing their meaning. If so, the fact that the items 
were related to the previous vignettes may have gone unnoticed. However, 
participants’ comments during the debriefing session made it clear that they noticed 
that “some” of the words were related to the previous part of the experiment.
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Another factor to consider is the fact that in presenting the vignettes, care was 
taken to equally emphasize both fairness and safety concerns. The reason for doing 
this was so that participants’ reactions would not be manipulated by the presented 
information and that they would respond to the follow-up questions in an unbiased 
way. The scope of reported attitudes suggests that the strategy was successful in this 
purpose but it may have backfired in some other ways. It is possible that newly 
developed attitudes are more subject to influence and that giving participants two- 
sided information lead to a sort of "diffusion” o f attitude. If so, both safety and 
fairness dimensions may have been equally available (i.e. activated) to all subjects at 
the time of the information-processing portion of the experiment, thus leading to no 
difference in accessibility. The explicit attitude measure (i.e. responses to post­
vignette questions) may not have been affected by the two-sided nature of the 
narratives, yet accessibility, an implicit measure, may indeed have been more 
seriously influenced by the presentation of both sides of the issue.
4.3.2 Attitudes
Participants’ reactions to the vignettes indicates that they were more 
concerned about the men’s behavior than about being fair to the men (the Safety score 
was significantly higher than the Fairness score, i (68) = 5.18. p  < .0001). Still, a fair 
level of conflict was reported between feeling nervous and intolerant. The mean 
conflict score reported was a 5.9 out of a possible maximum of 12 on the conflict 
index. This pattern of attitudes is well reflected in the size of the three groups, with 
the vast majority of the sample falling in the "safe” category (48% of participants) 
and ambivalent category (41.5%), whereas the "fair” group represented but a small
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11.5% of the participants. Given the close proximity in both time and space to the 
main site of the terrorist attacks, this reaction is not all that surprising.
As an interesting addition to the collected data, it should be noted that many 
participants have recalled anecdotes of such internal conflict. For example, one 
person reported feeling anxious when seeing a Muslim man carrying a cello case on 
the subway, thinking about what one could carry in such a package, yet also feeling 
guilty about having such unfriendly thoughts. Stories of this sort were the rule more 
than the exception during the debriefing sessions. Even the vignette depicting a 
situation in a plane (as well as a large part of this research) was inspired by events 
experienced by the author roughly a month after the attacks. It is thus with confidence 
that we propose that ambivalence is indeed an important (if recently developed) 
element o f American attitude toward people o f Arab origin or Islamic faith.
Considered together with measured attitude, these accounts bolster the notion 
that ambivalence is uncomfortable, and that conflicted individuals are motivated to 
reduce this distressing uncertainty. In spite of the un-encouraging results obtained in 
this first study, we still expect ambivalent individuals to react differently than non- 
ambivalent people when faced with one-sided information. Emphasizing one 
dimension of the ambivalence should still lead to increased reliance on that dimension 
when comes time for choosing a path of action. Although decision- making is not 
directly considered in the present research, it is argued that increased reliance on one 
attitudinal dimension is associated with increased accessibility of elements 
compatible with this dimension. Therefore, presenting participants with a potentially 
conflicted yet clearly one-sided situation should lead to increased accessibility of
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elements associated with this situation. This effect is expected to be even stronger for 
ambivalent individuals due to their increased motivation to process information that 
could reduce the magnitude of the conflict. Demonstrating this effect is the main 
objective o f Experiment 2.
4.3.3 Conclusions
Examination of these data is unfortunately inconclusive. There were no found 
differences in accessibility of safety and tolerance concerns based on endorsement. 
Even though there were fairly clear-cut differences in subjects’ attitudes toward the 
issue at hand, there were no apparent parallel differences in the degree of accessibility 
o f the safety and fairness concepts. Even more troubling is the fact there was not even 
a hint o f a correlation between subjects’ attitude score and their response latencies to 
the corresponding elements. Although not at all surprising, the fact that so few 
participants were classified as “fair” did not help this inquiry. Conclusions can hardly 
be drawn based on data obtained from only eight subjects. As far as ambivalent 
people go, they do not seem to be any different from their non-ambivalent 
counterparts in accessibility levels. The one thing we have learned is that New 
Yorkers’ attitudes are still strongly leaning toward safety some three months after the 
attacks.
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Chapter 5: Experiment 2, Choosing Sides: Pruning and Accessibility
The second experiment explored the cognitive nature of the response 
amplification effect. The method used was essentially identical to the one used in the 
first experiment, with the addition o f a priming condition. As in the first experiment, 
subjects first filled out a personality survey, following which the two short narratives 
were read. Participants’ reactions to the narratives were collected and used as a basis 
for classification in the ambivalent, fair, or safe categories. What distinguishes this 
experiment from the previous one was the presence of a third narrative designed to 
prime one dimension of the conflict. For the sake of clarity, the primes will be 
referred to as “vigilance-” (i.e. safety-) oriented and “tolerance-” (i.e. fairness-) 
oriented. The labels “fairness” and “safety” will be reserved for reference to the 
participants' dominant orientation.
Subjects were presented with either a tolerance-oriented or a vigilance- 
oriented prime. The prime was presented as a newspaper article and the situation 
described was identical in both conditions. It is only the conclusion of the events that 
differed across versions and that led one side of the ambivalence (i.e. tolerance or 
vigilance) to be more strongly activated. In the tolerance prime, innocent men are 
arrested and jailed because of “suspicious activity” whose interpretation is strongly 
tainted due to their ethnic background. In the vigilance prime, men are again arrested 
and jailed, only this time their intentions were less than charitable as a great quantity 
of explosives were found in their possession.
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5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants
One hundred and eighty Brooklyn College undergraduates participated in this 
experiment for partial fulfillment of a requirement for introductory psychology. Nine 
participants were eliminated from the analyses since their overall attitudes (they were 
deemed “undecided”) did not allow for categorization into one of the three main 
categories (ambivalent, fair, or safe). Details regarding this procedure will be 
presented in the results section. Roughly 92% of the participants were between the 
ages of 16 and 25 (80% of those were between 16 and 20 years old). The sample 
included 119 female (69.6%) and 52 male (30.4%) participants. Eighty three percent 
of the subjects identified English as the best language (64.9% had English as a first 
language). Additional demographic information is presented in Table 5.1. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two priming conditions (tolerance or vigilance).
5.1.2 Materials
The materials were identical to those used in the first experiment with the 
addition of one text in the “Reactions to Current Events” portion. Two short texts, 
presented as newspaper articles, were used as primes. Both texts depict identical 
events, however the ending differs greatly. The article describes events in an 
unmentioned New Jersey town where a gas station attendant alerted authorities about 
“suspicious activity” carried out by (Middle Eastern) customers. One of the stories is 
constructed to emphasize tolerance (i.e. fairness) and ends with the arrest and 
imprisonment of innocent men whereas the other text emphasizes vigilance (i.e.
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Age n Percentage o f  Sample
16 to 20 137 80.1
21 to 25 20 11.7
26 to 30 5 2.9
31 to 35 4 2.3
36 to 40 2 1.2
40 a n d  u d 3 1.8
Total 171 100
Table 5.1b: Ethnicitv 
Ethnic Background n Percent
Asian- (American) 18 10.5
African- (American) 12 7.0
Arab- (American) 2 1.2
East Indian 0 0
Latino 13 7.6
West Indian 23 13.5
White/C aucasian 75 43.9
Other 28 16.4
Total 171 100
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Religion n Percentage o f  Sample
Atheist 4 2.3
Buddhist 5 2.9
Christian 59 34.5
Hindu I 0.6
Islamic 12 7.0
Jewish/non-Orthodox 20 11.7
Jewish/Orthodox 43 25.1
None 11 6.4
Other 16 9.4
Total 171 100
Table 5. Id: Degree of Religiosity
How religious are you? n___________ Percentage
Not at all/in name only 24 14.0
Slightly 34 19.9
Moderately 45 26.3
Quite a bit 25 14.6
Extremely 30 17.5
Comoletelv 13 7.6
Total 171 100
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Table 5.1e: Participants’ subway experience
How often do you take the subway?________n___________ Percent
Less than once a year 3 1.8
Once or twice a year 12 7.0
Once every couple of months 21 12.3
Once or twice a month 31 18.1
Once a week 25 14.6
Three or more times a week 79 46.2
Total 171 100
How often do vou flv? H Percent
Never flown before 15 8.8
Less than once a year 89 52.0
About once a year 34 19.9
Two to three times a year 28 16.4
Four to six times a year 1.8
Six or more times a vear 2 1.2
Total 171 100
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safety) and concludes with the arrest of questionable characters, later charged with 
illegal possession of explosives. The events described are exactly the same in both 
versions. The last paragraph, describing the outcome, is the only one to differ across 
the two primes. The article appears in Times New Roman font (to make it distinct 
from the previous texts) with all names of people and places blacked out to increase 
credibility (see appendix H for the tolerance prime and appendix I for the vigilance 
prime).
5.1.3 Procedure
The procedure was identical to the one that used in Experiment 1 except for 
the addition of a prime in the second segment ("Reactions to Current Events”). After 
the participants read the two vignettes and responded to their associated questions, 
they were instructed to carefully read a third text (described as a "reprint of a 
newspaper article”). To further enhance the emotional appeal of the prime, 
participants were asked to think about the implications that the events described 
might have on the people involved. A bogus newspaper article was used to draw 
attention to one dimension of the ambivalence. Two different articles were used, one 
emphasizing tolerance, the other emphasizing vigilance. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of these two conditions. Following the prime, the subjects took part in 
the accessibility portion of the experiment where, as in Experiment 1. they were 
presented with a series o f words and nonwords and asked to judge the lexical status 
(word or nonword) of each item as quickly as possible. The procedures followed in 
this third section were identical to those described in the first study and the words 
presented were also the same as those used in study 1 (i.e. associated with the
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concepts o f safety and fairness). Demographic information was also collected from 
the participants once they completed the lexical decision task. Participants were fully 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Expectations
As in Study 1. subjects’ dominant attitude was first assessed through the 
ambivalence index. Subjects scoring in the upper third were classified as ambivalent, 
and those in the bottom two thirds were classified as either Fairness- or Safety- 
oriented, according to which of those two scores is highest.
It was predicted that the two non-ambivalent groups would not be greatly 
affected by the prime and that their reaction times (RT) to the words should reflect 
their dominant attitude, especially after being presented with a prime that is 
compatible with their beliefs. Fairness-oriented subjects should categorize fairness 
words faster than Safety-oriented subjects and. conversely. Safety-oriented subjects 
should have an easier time categorizing safety words (i.e. what they agree with) than 
the Fairness-oriented group. Inhibition was expected to be present whenever 
ambivalent participants were involved. Ambivalent subjects’ reaction time to the 
words should be a function of the priming condition. Under the Tolerance prime, 
ambivalent people should categorize the compatible (fair) words relatively fast but 
should show inhibition on those same words (now being incompatible) under the 
Vigilance prime. The reverse pattern should appear with safety words in that 
ambivalent subjects should react to those words relatively fast in the Vigilance
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condition but should show slower reaction times to those same words in the 
Tolerance condition.
5.2.2 Attitude Assessment
As in Experiment One, participants' overall attitudes were based on their 
responses to the six post-vignette questions. Given that those questions were 
presented before the prime, the procedures followed by the subjects up to that point 
were identical to those of Study One. Since it was shown in the first experiment that 
these measures were reliable, dominant attitude was here determined in the exact 
same manner and based on the exact same questions as in the previous study.
5.2.2.1 Fairness and safety scores
For each o f the vignettes, we summed the responses to the set of six questions 
(three assessing safety concerns and three assessed fairness concerns) to obtain 
Fairness and Safety scores associated with each vignette. Pearson correlations on 
safety and fairness scores between the two vignettes were significant at the .01 level 
(.50 and .55, respectively). Overall Fairness and Safety attitude scores were obtained 
by summing participants' responses to the six questions associated with each 
dimension (three safety and three fairness questions associated with each of the two 
vignettes). Since each response is based on a six-point scale, the minimum score is 6 
and the maximum score is 36. The mean Fairness score was M  = 16.15 (SD = 6.11. 
range 6-34), the mean Safety score was M=  21.46 (SD = 7.19, range 6-36).
5.2.2.2 Dominant attitude and ambivalence level
We repeated the procedure used in Study 1 to assess dominant attitude and 
degree of ambivalence. Ambivalence scores were obtained for each participant by
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inserting their mean Safety and mean Fairness scores in the Ambivalence index 
described by Hass and Eisenstadt (1993). Thus, the formula ambivalence = W2/S  
(where W represents the score on the weakest of the two component scores and S, the 
strongest of the two component scores) was used to assess ambivalence. Given the 
minimum and maximum scores (6 and 36 respectively) on the Fairness and Safety 
Dimensions, possible ambivalence scores range from 1 to 36. The mean ambivalence 
score obtained in this study was M=  11.18 (SD = 6.20, range 1 to 28.03).
In addition to the safety and fairness questions that followed each vignette, 
participants were also asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced 
"conflict from feeling both nervous and intolerant" toward Arabs/Muslims. The 
Pearson correlation on reported conflict between the two vignettes was r = .54. p  <
.01. The sum of the responses to these two questions (one after each of the vignettes) 
represents "conflict” index. The possible scores on the conflict index range from 2 
(minimum conflict -  "not at all conflicted”) to 12 (maximum conflict -  "extremely 
conflicted”). The mean conflict score was M= 5.27 (SD = 2.6. range 2 to 12). The 
correlation between the self-reported conflict index and assessed level of ambivalence 
index was significant; r  = .37. p  < .001.
We classified participants as ambivalent-, fairness-, or safety-oriented using 
the same criteria that were used in Experiment 1. Subjects who had an ambivalence 
score o f 14.06 or above were labeled "ambivalent”; those below this score were 
categorized as "fair” or "safe” according to which of these two scores was highest. 
Based on this criterion, 32.8% (n=59) of the participants fell into the ambivalent 
group, 9.4% (n=l7) were classified as fair, and 52.8% («=95) were labeled as "safe”.
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Nine of the participants (5%) did not have a dominant attitude (i.e. fairness score was 
equal to the safety score) and failed to score above the predetermined criterion to be 
classified as ambivalent (i.e. their ambivalence score was lower than 14.06). They 
were thus labeled as undecided and were dropped from the analyses. The usable 
sample thus consisted of 171 participants.
The average ambivalence scores for the three remaining groups were M = 
18.26 (SD = 3.90, range 14.06 to 28.03) for the ambivalent group, A/=6.68 (SD =
3.42, range 1.44 to 12.07) for the fair group, and M  = 7.65 (SD = 3.64. range 1 to 
13.76) for the safe group. The mean safety scores were M= 23.59 (SD = 4.75, range 
15 to 35) for the Ambivalent group, M  = 10.82 (SD = 3.07. range 6 to 16) for the Fair 
group, and M = 23.06 (SD = 6.70. range 9 to 36) for the Safe group. The fairness 
scores were M=  21.53 (SD = 4.22. range 15 to 32) for the Ambivalent category, M = 
20.46 (SD = 6.51, range 12 to 34) for the Fair group and M= 12.57 (SD = 3.83. range 
6 to 20) for the Safe group. A graphical representation of those various scores is 
offered in Figure 5.1.
5.2.3 The Effect of Prime on Accessibility
Data obtained in Study One revealed that the Ambivalent. Safety, and 
Fairness groups did not differ in terms of how accessible the various concepts were. 
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to explore the possibility that ambivalent 
individuals’ polarized judgments may be caused by a change in accessibility resulting 
from the presentation of a prime. To reiterate the current predictions, it was expected 
that ambivalent individuals would deal with their conflicted feelings by increasing
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Figure 5.1: Mean Fairness and Safety Scores bv Dominant Attitude
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reliance on the dimension of the attitude consistent with the current situation (i.e. the 
prime) and by inhibiting information incompatible with the prime. We therefore 
expected that, when comparing responses across priming conditions, the ambivalent 
group would show slower reaction time to the words incompatible with the prime. All 
data reported here are based on correct responses only. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two priming conditions. The Tolerance prime included a total 
of 83 participants, 31 of which were in the Ambivalent group. 7 in the Fair group, and 
45 in the Safety group. Twenty-eight ambivalent participants were assigned to the 
Tolerance prime, along with 10 Fair and 50 Safe participants, for a total of 88 
subjects.
5.2.3.1 Fairness dimension
Data from the 3 (attitude: Fair. Safe. Ambivalent) x 2 (prime: Tolerance. 
Vigilance) between-subjects design were analyzed through a 2-way analysis of 
variance. An interaction was expected showing the prime to have a different effect 
depending on participant's dominant attitude. Specifically, planned comparisons 
should reveal that ambivalent subjects show greater reaction time (i.e. inhibition) in 
the Vigilance prime compared to Fairness-oriented participants and a greater 
difference in reaction time to the same words across primes than do non-ambivalent 
subjects.
The mean reaction times and accuracy rates to the six conditions are reported 
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, respectively (those tables include data for the control words and 
the nonwords as well). The main comparison was between the responses of the 
Ambivalent and the Safe groups under the Vigilance (i.e. Safety prime) where the
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Table 5.2: Mean Reaction Time (msec) bv Prime and Attitude -  Fair Words
Dominant Attitude
Ambivalent Fair Safe Total
Word type____________________________________________________________
Fair Words
Tolerance M 681.48 648.19 715.44 696.99
SD (162.51) (124.13) (138.06) (145.16)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 712.46 758.05 688.13 703.11
SD (135.05) (170.02) (114.05) (127.20)
n 31 7 45 83
Control-Fair
Tolerance M 707.36 643.05 759.77 729.83
SD (172.52) (123.99) (165.15) (155.45)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 765.10 724.97 705.79 729.56
SD (168.44) (168.58) (127.62) (148.29)
n 31 7 45 83
Nonwords
Tolerance M 797.95 785.08 820.43 809.26
SD (185.67) (140.04) (165.74) (168.46)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 866.26 846.34 791.38 823.98
SD (168.93) (230.05) (129.24) (156.78)
n 31 7 45 83
Note: Control-Fair words are neutral words matched for length and frequency with
the Fair words
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Table 5.3: Mean Accuracy (percent correct) bv Prime and Attitude -  Fair Words
Dominant Attitude
Word type
Ambivalent Fair Safe Total
Fair Words
Tolerance M 90.36 100.00 93.2 93.07
SD (12.01) (0.00) (8.19) (7.95)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 93.23 92.86 95.78 94.58
SD (7.48) (9.51) (6.90) (7.38)
n 31 7 45 83
Control-Fair
Tolerance M 87.14 95.00 93.00 91.36
SD (14.26) (8.50) (7.63) (10.63)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 91.61 88.57 92.00 91.57
SD (8.20) (12.15) (8.42) (8.62)
n 31 7 45 83
Nonwords
Tolerance M 81.51 90.29 88.06 86.23
SD (17.30) (9.10) (9.00) (12.57)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 85.10 86.13 87.78 86.64
SD (12.43) (7.91) (10.15) (10.86)
n 31 7 45 83
Note: Control-Fair words are neutral words matched for length and frequency with 
the Fair words
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mean RTs were M= 712.46 (SD = 135.05) for the Ambivalent group and M=  688.13 
(SD = 114.05) for the Safe group. A graph of overall reaction time by conditions is 
presented in Figure 5.2. The results o f the 2-way ANOVA reported no significant 
differences, F <  1. The main effect of ambivalence was also non-significant (F < 1). 
as were the main effect of priming condition. F ( 1. 165) = 1.96. p  = .164, and the 
interaction, F (2, 165) = 2A4.p  = .12. Similar results were obtained when the 
dependent measure was exposed to a logarithmic transformation, with Fs <1 for the 
overall and main effects of ambivalence. The main effect of prime and the interaction 
were also non-significant, F (I, 165) = 2.31,/? > .05 and F ( 2, 165) = 2.23.p > .05. 
respectively. Combining the Fair and Safe groups into one non-ambivalent group 
yielded even less impressive results, all Fs < 1. Given the absence of any significant 
effect, no further comparisons were computed.
5.2.3.2 Safety dimension
A comparable strategy was used for the Safety words, that is, the data from 
the 3 (attitude: Fair, Safe, Ambivalent) x 2 (prime: Tolerance. Vigilance) between- 
subjects design were analyzed through a 2-way analysis o f variance. Parallel 
predictions were made with safety words, that is. an interaction showing a greater 
effect of prime for ambivalent subjects than for non-ambivalent subjects. In addition, 
planned comparisons were expected to show evidence of inhibition under the 
Tolerance prime for the ambivalent subjects (compared to the Safety-oriented 
participants). Also, compared to the two non-ambivalent groups, the ambivalent 
group was expected to show a greater difference in reaction time across priming 
conditions.
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The mean reaction times and accuracy rates to the six conditions are reported in 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. The main comparison was between the responses 
o f the Ambivalent and the Fair groups under the Tolerance prime (i.e. Fairness 
prime). The mean reaction times were M= 672.89 (SD = 178.78) for the Ambivalent 
group and A/= 679.87 (SD = 135.71) for the Fair group. A graph o f overall reaction 
time by conditions is presented in Figure 5.3. The results of the 2-way ANOVA 
reported no significant differences, F  < I . The main effect of ambivalence was also 
non-significant, as were the main effect o f priming condition, and the interaction, (all 
Fs < 1). Logarithmic transformations did not help our cause, all Fs < 1. except for the 
prime by ambivalence interaction which was also non-significant. F (2 . 165) = 1.078. 
p  > .05. As in the previous section, combining the Safe and Fair group into one non- 
ambivalent group did not change the overall conclusions. The overall F and the main 
effect of priming condition were Fs < I. the main effect and interaction were also 
non-significant, F (1. 159) = 1.342 and F ( I. 159) = 1.70. bothps > .05. Given the 
absence of any significant effect, no further comparisons were computed.
5.3 Discussion
5.3.1 Priming
The main goal of this experiment was to test the idea that ambivalent 
individuals deal with their conflicted feelings by processing related information and 
by further using this newly acquired information to reduce the degree o f uncertainty.
It was proposed that ambivalent people do this by increasing reliance on information 
presently available and by inhibiting bits of knowledge incompatible with currently
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Table 5.4: Mean Reaction Time (msec) bv Prime and Attitude -  Safe Words
Dominant Attitude
Ambivalent Fair Safe Total
Word type
Safe Words
Tolerance M 672.89 679.87 677.65 676.39
SD (178.68) (135.71) (148.05) (155.45)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 704.09 704.95 646.60 672.99
SD (150.76) (136.76) (101.87) (155.45)
n 31 7 45 83
Control-Safe
Tolerance M 673.85 678.55 710.75 695.35
SD (144.37) (158.14) (142.15) (144.06)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 704.70 712.92 654.12 695.35
SD (144.37) (158.14) (142.15) (144.06)
n 31 7 45 83
Nonwords
Tolerance M 797.95 785.08 820.43 809.26
SD (185.67) (140.04) (165.74) (168.46)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 866.26 846.34 791.38 823.98
SD (168.93) (230.05) (129.24) (156.78)
n 31 7 45 83
Note: Control-Safe words are neutral words matched for length and frequency with 
the Safe words.
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Table 5.5: Mean Accuracy (percent correct) bv Prime and Attitude -  Safe Words
Dominant Attitude
Word type 
Safe Words
Ambivalent Fair Safe Total
Tolerance M 88.57 98.00 90.20 90.57
SD (10.08) (4.22) (7.69) (8.62)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 90.00 90.00 91.11 90.60
SD (8.94) (8.17) (6.82) (7.71)
n 31 7 45 83
Control-Safe
Tolerance M 92.14 99.00 96.20 95.23
SD (11.34) (3.16) (6.35) (8.30)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 93.87 94.29 96.89 90.60
SD (9.55) (7.87) (6.68) (7.71)
n 31 7 45 83
Nonwords
Tolerance M 81.51 90.29 88.06 86.23
SD (17.30) (9.10) (9.00) (12.57)
n 28 10 50 88
Vigilance M 85.10 86.13 87.78 86.64
SD (12.43) (7.91) (10.15) (10.86)
n 31 7 45 83
Note: Control-Safe words are neutral words matched for length and frequency with 
the Safe words.
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Figure 5.3: Safe Words- Mean Reaction Times bv Condition
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available data. We expected that ambivalent participants reaction times would be 
greatly affected by the presence o f a prime, specifically, that they would show 
lowered reaction times to concepts compatible with the prime and inflated 
response latencies to items incompatible with the prime. The data reported here offers 
no support for this notion.
Even though the results from the first experiment showed that ambivalent and 
non-ambivalent participants did not differ in terms of accessibility levels of concepts 
related to the issues presented, we still had hope that adding a priming manipulation 
would create differences between the various groups by clearly putting the emphasis 
on one of the two dimensions of the attitude. This was not the case. Not only were 
there no differences between ambivalent and non-ambivalent subjects (Fairness- or 
Safety-oriented), worse still, the prime did not even seem to have any impact on ease 
of access for any of the subjects. It thus looks as though our prime was really no 
prime at all.
It is possible that the participants were not as involved in the prime as 
expected. Some of student participants reported that they did not believe the 
newspaper article to be real. Even though it was only a minority of subjects who 
actively reported their doubts, it is quite possible that there were enough "non­
believers” to rule out any appearance of an effect. Yet, during the debriefing sessions, 
it was apparent that there were probably a larger proportion of participants who. in 
fact, believed in the deception (unless, of course, they were simply trying to indulge 
the experimenter...). In any case, the prime did not create the intended effect.
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It was previously suggested (e.g. Hass et al., 1992) that, in order to create an 
amplification effect, the context must have some kind of affective appeal. This would 
not have occurred unless the participants really took the time to carefully read and 
internalize the implications of the events described. Overall, it is apparent that the 
subjects read through the prime fairly quickly (mean reading time was about 3 
minutes for a 2 page text) and may therefore not have benefited from the true impact 
o f the described events. Similarly to the situation described after the first experiment, 
unless the lexical decision task was performed with information from the previous 
section still in mind, the participants may not have processed the words in the context 
of safety and fairness. If the deeper meaning of the words was not processed (and 
unfortunately we have no means of verifying that), then the prime would indeed not 
have acted as a prime since the cognitive link between the newspaper reprint and 
following task would have vanished. Even more problematic is the possibility that the 
so-called safety and fairness words may not have been representative of their intended 
dimensions (more on that later).
5.3.2 Attitudes: Better Safe than Sorrv...
Analogous to what was revealed in the first study, it does seem as though a 
sizeable proportion of sample does in fact value both safety and fairness and that 
these issues are often at odds with one another. About a third of our sample (32.8%) 
was considered to be ambivalent while roughly half (52.8%) emphasized safety above 
all. Along with the 9.4% of participants who fell in the Fair category, those numbers 
are comparable to what was observed in Study One. It thus looks as though, a few
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months after the events, most people are still choosing to emphasize vigilance over 
tolerance.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion and Conclusions
6.1 What Was Hoped For
6.1.2 Review of Main Proposal
The purpose of this project was to explore the cognitive processes underlying 
the response amplification effect. It was proposed that ambivalent individuals might 
use a dual strategy of activation/inhibition to deal with the discomfort associated with 
their conflicted feelings. This proposal was based mainly on the response 
amplification phenomenon, which suggests that being in a state of ambivalence leads 
to extreme reactions. It has been shown in the past that when faced with the object of 
their ambivalence (typically, outgroup members have been used as targets), people 
tend to rely heavily on immediately available information (e.g. Bell & Esses. 1997: 
Hass et al., 1991). For instance, situations in which a target behaves in a positive way 
has been associated with inflated positive judgments on the part of ambivalent 
subjects, whereas contexts in which the target behaves in an undesirable manner have 
been associated with negatively polarized judgments. Differences between the two 
types o f situations were not as strong when the raters did not have ambivalent feelings 
toward the target.
Bell and Esses (1997) offered one attractive account for the RAE when they 
suggested that the amplified reactions of ambivalent individuals might be due to 
priming. It was proposed that since ambivalent people possess facts along two 
separate dimensions available in memory, both o f these dimensions are available to 
be primed whereas people who are not ambivalent only possess representations along 
one dimension. Being limited to information along one dimension only would limit
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the direction o f priming to only one route. What was suggested in the present set of 
experiments is that, although priming may be enough for the appearance of the 
amplification effect, it alone would not provide an desirable strategy for dealing with 
the conflicted feelings.
Our proposal was that activation (i.e. priming) of attitudinal elements 
compatible with the current situation should be accompanied by concurrent inhibition 
of incompatible elements. This is the only strategy that would not only allow 
individuals to make use of newly arriving information but that would also block 
conflicting information from re-entry into consciousness. Priming accompanied by 
inhibition is the only strategy that would lead to a reduction in the amount of 
conflicting information available to the individual. If. as Katz (1981) suggested, one 
important goal for ambivalent individuals is to reduce the conflict and its associated 
indecision, the enhancement/suppression process we proposed should help attitudes 
serve their purpose (i.e. guide behavior and information processing) better by 
increasing stability (albeit momentarily).
6.1.2 What Was Done
In addition to testing the inhibition idea, a few changes were made to answer 
our critiques of previous studies. Since the claim was made that accessibility is at the 
root o f the effect, reaction time was used as a dependent measure (previous studies 
had relied mostly on judgment ratings - e.g. Bell & Esses, 1997; Hass et al., 1991; 
Katz, 1981). We also had concerns about the composition of the groups in some of 
the existing studies. Some had simply assumed ambivalent feelings to be present 
(Gibbons et al., 1980; Hass et al., 1991; Linville & Jones, 1980) and when
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ambivalence level was measured, the comparison group combined both “Pro'’ and 
“Anti” subjects (e.g. Bell & Esses). Our experiment made sure to analyze the data 
from the Fair (i.e. Pro) and Safe (i.e. Anti) groups separately since we were concerned 
that the responses from these two groups may annul one another.
Our precise expectations were that under a Safety prime, ambivalent subjects 
would show inhibition (i.e. increased reaction time) of the fairness-oriented words 
(compared to the Fair group) and that under a Fairness prime, they would show 
inhibition of the safety-oriented words (compared to the Safe group). Thus, as a 
comparison, we always used the group that, in theory, should also have had those 
words easily available in memory.
6.2 What Is
Given the questionable reliability of the RAE. it was clear that the challenge 
would be a tough one to face, yet hopes were still high. Unfortunately, as more time 
was spent looking at the data, these naive expectations were quickly crushed. We had 
hoped for clear and definite conclusions regarding ambivalence and its effect on 
accessibility of cognitive structures. Unfortunately, the data obtained do not permit 
any strong claims in this regard. Not only did we not find any support for inhibition, 
we did not even find any hint of a priming effect.
In hindsight, the lack of evidence for inhibition may not be that surprising.
Our argument regarding inhibition was strongly based on the concept of negative 
priming reported in memory research. It has lately come to my attention that in most 
of the studies reporting negative priming, participants were explicitly asked to limit 
their responses to a subset of alternatives (e.g. Anderson & Spellman, 1995). In the
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present situation, it was presumed that this process would kick in automatically, 
which may not be the case. Perhaps asking participants to actively focus on one 
dimension only would have resulted in different outcomes.
Obviously though, the more problematic finding (or lack thereof) is the 
absence of any priming. That inhibition not be found is one thing, that priming not be 
present is a much bigger problem. At this point, it is not clear if the participants did 
not pay attention to the prime or if the text was not powerful enough to create any 
changes in accessibility. Perhaps also the manner in which the task was carried out is 
to blame for the inconclusiveness of this research.
6.2.1 Problems
Matters always have a way of getting more intelligible after the fact. In 
hindsight, it is easy to see that we may have gone wrong in a number of ways. Let us 
examine just a few of these possibilities.
6.2.1.1 Safety and Fairness Words
One obvious problem with the research is that what were referred to as 
‘‘safety” and “fairness” words appeared to not have been related to these issues at all. 
At the very least, they did not correlate with our attitudinal measures o f fairness and 
safety (see Table 4.4). Even though, at face value, the words seem related to the 
issues of fairness and safety, there does not appear to be a cognitive link between 
them. It is possible (but given the meaning of the words, this seems unlikely) that the 
words used did not accurately represent the issues of fairness and safety. If the words 
are indeed unrelated to the issues, then it is no surprise that priming did not occur. 
Other speculations include the idea that perhaps the words were processed outside the
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context of the prime. It is possible that too much time had elapsed between the 
presentation of the prime and the beginning of the information-processing task.
Simply reading the instructions may have taken the participants’ minds off the prime, 
thus eliminating any association between the prime and the target words.
6.2.1.2 Attitude Accessibility
This research locked in on the idea of priming based on a slew of data 
showing that attitudes are subject to accessibility manipulations (e.g. Bargh et al.. 
1992; Fazio et al., 1986, Fazio, 1989; Tourangeau & Rasinski. 1988). Fazio is one of 
the main advocates behind the idea that, in order to have any kind of influence on 
judgment, an attitude must first be activated, and that the stronger the attitude, the 
easier it is to access. Perhaps the fairness and safety attitudes were not quite strong 
enough to influence judgment and affect reaction times. Even if the attitudes were 
strong enough to exert any influence on judgment, perhaps they were no more 
activated by the time the lexical decision task had started.
It should also be noted that most of the studies showing priming effects with 
regards to attitude have used “immediate’’ primes. In other words, the attitude object 
was presented immediately before the target. For example. Fazio et al. (1986) 
presented pairs like “war-bad” in which the speed of response to the second word was 
measured. Thus, in most studies looking at attitude accessibility, the target words was 
immediately preceded by the prime, thus making the association between the two 
terms quite direct. In the present case, it was decided not to use such a strategy for 
fear of being too obvious (we would have hardly tricked anyone with word pairs such
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as “bomb-threat” or “innocent-unfair”). In this sense, our measure of accessibility 
was much more subtle and implicit than the ones previously used.
6.2.1.3 Back to the RAE
Previous demonstrations of the RAE have shown judgment ratings to be 
amplified in a situation of ambivalence. In these studies, participants were instructed 
to assign ratings to an individual or a group after being presented with a situation in 
which the target was behaving favorably or not. These studies (for instance. Bell & 
Esses, 1997; Hass et al., 1991; Katz, 1981) thus also required participants to exert a 
reaction that was deliberate and explicit. Moreover, judgment ratings demand that 
individuals evaluate a person. There was therefore a clear connection between the 
situation the subjects were exposed to and the dependent measure. For example. Hass 
et al. (1991) had participants rate a person that was directly responsible for their 
team's success or failure. This is very different from the strategy used in the current 
research. The dependent measure used here was much more detached from the 
previous situation. Participants were not informed that any relation existed between 
the two parts of the experiment. They were simply presented with the items and asked 
to judge whether they were words or not. Therefore, not only were the words used not 
descriptive of a person (i.e. very different from judgment ratings), they were 
seemingly unrelated to the previous portion of the experiment. Therefore, by trying to 
get at a direct and implicit measure of accessibility, we may have gained subtlety but 
may have lost crucial participants' involvement.
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6.3 Concluding Remarks 
Katz (1981) was the one who suggested that, in the face of conflicted feelings, 
an individual is likely to experience a threat to self-esteem. He further proposed that 
one possible defensive reaction might involve “the suppression of one side of the 
ambivalence equation and enhancement o f the other side, so that overt treatment of 
the attitudinal object becomes either extremely positive or negative” (p. 10). Although 
not exactly reliable, the notion of “enhancement” has been supported through various 
response amplification studies (for example, Katz, 1981; Hass et al., 1991; Hass et 
al.,1992) where it was shown that personally relevant situations that threaten one's 
self-concept are associated with polarized judgments of stigmatized individuals. 
However, the “suppression” side of the problem had only been assumed to be present 
and had never been directly tested until now. The enhancement/suppression idea has 
been suggested to be associated with priming and/or changes in accessibility but ease 
of access per se had not been directly assessed either (Bell & Esses. 1997; Jonas et 
al., 1997; Katz & Hass, 1988; Tourangeau et al.. 1991). Thus in addition to seeking 
support for the notion of inhibition, we were seeking to polish the cognitive claims 
behind ambivalence effects by using reaction time, a much more direct measure of 
accessibility than judgment ratings. The research proposed to seek long-awaited 
answers to questions that have haunted psychology for many years. Regrettably, we 
find ourselves facing many new questions without having satisfactorily answered 
those we were seeking to answer.
We had hoped to provide evidence supporting the presence of inhibitory 
processes and as such fill in an important gap in the ambivalence literature. Providing
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evidence that components of attitude structure undergo predictable changes in 
accessibility as a function of context is undoubtedly a matter o f great interest. Had it 
been successful, the research reported here would have made an important 
contribution to the field of psychology. Yet, in spite of its shortcomings, potentially 
valuable information is to be gained from this endeavor. We have pursued in a new 
trend through the integration of various areas within psychology. I truly believe that 
this strategy will give rise to a better and more complete understanding o f the 
workings of the mind. Despite the disappointing results, one o f the most appealing 
features of this research lies in its interesting blend of social and cognitive 
psychology, and as such this projects fits in nicely with the impending state of the 
field. Further pursuits in the observations of the dialectical influences between social 
and cognitive processes will undoubtedly prove valuable not just for social 
psychology but for cognitive research as well.
Moreover, although it was not our main objective, the data collected in these 
experiments provide information about how individuals are dealing with potentially 
threatening situations in the aftermath of the September 11th tragedy. We now know 
that in spite of our best efforts, most of us seem inclined to err on the side of safety at 
the cost of being unfair to others. Such information has potential to become highly 
valuable in the near future as researchers start looking at the impact of those events 
on issues such as intergroup relations, prejudice, attitudes, etc. Thus, the fact that we 
used, not only current, but especially defining events as our main manipulation can 
only magnify the importance and relevance o f this research.
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Appendix A: Neuroticism Scale
Please read each of the following statement and determine whether it is 
representative o f you or not. Indicate your answer by pressing the appropriate key on 
the button box. If the statement is characteristic of you, press the #1 key; if it is 
uncharacteristic of you (i.e. not like you), press the #2 key. There are no right or 
wrong answer, and no trick questions. Work quickly and do not think too long about 
the exact meaning of the question.
1. Does your mood often go up and down?
2. Do you ever feel “just miserable” for no reason?
3. Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said?
4. Are you an irritable person?
5. Are your feelings easily hurt?
6. Do you often feel fed-up?
7. Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt?
8. Would you call yourself a nervous person?
9. Are you a worrier?
10. Do you worry about awful things that might happen?
11. Would you call yourself tense or “highly strung”?
12. Do you worry about yourself?
13. Do you suffer from sleeplessness?
14. Have you felt listless and tired for no reason?
15. Do you ever feel life is very dull?
16. Do you worry a lot about your looks?
17. Have you ever wished you were dead?
18. Do you worry long after an embarrassing experience?
19. Do you ever feel lonely?
20. Are you touchy about certain things?
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Appendix B: Need for Cognition Scale
For each of the following statements, please indicate to what extent you agree 
with the statement. For example, if you strongly disagree (i.e. the statement is not at 
all like you), you should press the #1 key; but if you strongly agree (i.e. the statement 
is very much like you), you should press the #6 key. Of course, the statement may be 
neither like or unlike you; if so, please use one of the numbers in the middle of the 
scale that best describes you.
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems
2. 1 like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 
to challenge my thinking abilities.
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to 
think in depth about something.
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
8. I prefer about small, daily projects to long-term ones.
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11.1 really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me much.
13.1 prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15.1 would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
16.1 feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort.
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17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it 
works.
18.1 usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally.
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Appendix C: Need for Closure Scale
This scale assesses your preference for certain types o f situations. Please read 
each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it. Indicate 
your answer by pressing the corresponding key on the button box. For example, if 
you strongly disagree with the statement, you would press the #1 key. but if you 
disagree with it only a little, you would press the #3 key.
1. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
2. My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.
3. I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important 
characteristics of a good student.
4. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
5. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
6. I don't like situations that are uncertain.
7. I like to have friends who are unpredictable.
8. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might 
happen.
9. I dislike unpredictable situations.
10.1 don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
11. When faced with a problem I usually see the one best decision very quickly.
12.1 usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.
13.1 would describe myself as indecisive.
14.1 tend to struggle with most decisions.
15. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it’s 
confusing.
16. I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things.
17. It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind.
18.1 feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention is unclear to me.
19. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong.
20. Even after I’ve made up my mind about something. I'm always eager to consider 
a different opinion.
21. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could 
be right.
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22. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the 
issue as possible.
2 3 .1 always see many different solutions to problems I face.
2 4 .1 do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
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Appendix D: Vignettes Relating to Current Events -  Plane Version 
Imagine you are getting on a  plane for a  flight from New York to San  
Francisco. Your identification and boarding p ass are  being checked by airport 
staff, and you are  allowed to walk onto the aircraft. You make your way to 
your sea t. You sit down and m ake yourself comfortable, eagerly awaiting 
departure. To kill time, you chat with the person sitting next to you and you 
glance at the  other passengers. Everything seem s under control and you start 
to relax. You take a book out of your bag and decide that, since it is a  long 
flight, it would be more convenient to put your luggage and coat in the 
overhead compartment. As you do so, a tall man brushes against you. The 
m an keeps on walking, barely taking note of you. You look up at him and the 
m an accompanying him and notice that they both look like they might be of 
Middle Eastern origin. His companion also walks by you and both men take 
their se a ts  in the next row. The second man has his right arm in a cast and 
se e m s to be having a bit of trouble opening the storage compartment. You 
look a t his injured arm and start thinking that a  cast might be a good place to 
conceal something. Then again, perhaps you’re being overly dramatic. You 
wouldn’t want people to think that way about you if you were in a cast. You 
briefly look down a t the tall m an and se e  that he has a copy of the  Koran on 
his lap. He looks up at you and says something to his travel companion, but 
you can 't quite m ake it out. Even though you don’t want to pre-judge them  
and you know that there is no real reason for you to worry you just can 't help 
thinking that their behavior is som ewhat unsettling.
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Plane Vignette: Follow-up Questions
A. How suspicious of the men would you be?
1) not at all suspicious
2) slightly suspicious
3) moderately suspicious
4) suspicious
5) very suspicious
6) extremely suspicious
B. How discriminatory would you feel about being suspicious of the men
1) not at all discriminatory
2) slightly discriminatory
3) moderately discriminatory
4) discriminatory
5) very discriminatory
6) extremely discriminatory
C. How anxious would the men's behavior make you feel?
1) not at all anxious
2) slightly anxious
3) moderately anxious
4) anxious
5) very anxious
6) extremely anxious
D. How unfair would you feel about being anxious about the men?
1) not at all unfair
2) slightly unfair
3) moderately unfair
4) unfair
5) very unfair
6) extremely unfair
E. How uncomfortable would the men's attitude make you feel?
1) not at all uncomfortable
2) slightly uncomfortable
3) moderately uncomfortable
4) uncomfortable
5) very uncomfortable
6) extremely uncomfortable
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F. How biased would you feel about being uncomfortable around the men?
1) not at all biased
2) slightly biased
3) moderately biased
4) biased
5) very biased
6) extremely biased
G. Indicate the degree to which you experience conflict from feeling both nervous 
and intolerant toward Muslims?
1) not at all conflicted
2) slightly conflicted
3) moderately conflicted
4) conflicted
5) very conflicted
6) extremely conflicted
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Appendix E: Vignettes Relating to Current Events — Subway Version 
It is Tuesday morning, you are on your way to the subw ay station. You 
go through the turnstile and step  onto the crowded platform. It is still fairly 
early, so  the train station is packed with commuters, as it generally is this time 
of day. You look over to se e  if a  train is coming, but there is none in sight. 
There is a  group of m en sitting on a  nearby bench. You can hear them  talking 
softly, yet impatiently. You cannot understand what they are  saying since 
they are  speaking som e foreign language. It may be Arabic, you can ’t tell for 
sure. Their conversation is getting louder and louder and there is no doubt in 
your mind that there is a  se n se  of urgency in their tone of voice. You’re 
wondering what it’s  all about. O ne of the men seem s to a ssum e the role of 
leader and attem pts to resolve the conflict. He talks to the rest of the group in 
a  pressing manner. He looks a t his watch, utters a  forceful com m and, and all 
the m en quickly m ake their way out of the train station. You watch them  rush 
by you and go up the stairway. Finding their actions a  little odd, you look back 
a t w here they were sitting and notice a package wrapped in brown paper on 
the floor next to the bench. You get an uneasy  feeling in the pit of your 
stom ach. You know your reaction is not quite justified and you w onder if you 
would be feeling this way if the m en not been Arabic. The package m ay not 
even be theirs, for all you know it may even be trash. Even if it is theirs, they 
may simply have forgotten it in their haste. Of course, it is also possible that 
they purposely left it in the crowded station. You are wondering w hether you 
should pick up the parcel and catch up with them or just run away.
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Subwav Vignette: Follow-up Questions
A. How suspicious of the men would you be?
1) not at all suspicious
2) slightly suspicious
3) moderately suspicious
4) suspicious
5) very suspicious
6) extremely suspicious
B. How discriminatory would you feel about being suspicious of the
1) not at all discriminatory
2) slightly discriminatory
3) moderately discriminatory
4) discriminatory
5) very discriminatory
6) extremely discriminatory
C. How anxious would the men's behavior make you feel?
1) not at all anxious
2) slightly anxious
3) moderately anxious
4) anxious
5) very anxious
6) extremely anxious
D. How unfair would you feel about being anxious about the men?
1) not at all unfair
2) slightly unfair
3) moderately unfair
4) unfair
5) very unfair
6) extremely unfair
E. How uncomfortable would the men’s attitude make you feel?
1) not at all uncomfortable
2) slightly uncomfortable
3) moderately uncomfortable
4) uncomfortable
5) very uncomfortable
6) extremely uncomfortable
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F. How biased would you feel about being uncomfortable around the men
1) not at all biased
2) slightly biased
3) moderately biased
4) biased
5) very biased
6) extremely biased
G. Indicate the degree to which you experience conflict from feeling both 
nervous and intolerant toward Arabs?
1) not at all conflicted
2) slightly conflicted
3) moderately conflicted
4) conflicted
5) very conflicted
6) extremely conflicted
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Appendix F: Word/Nonword List
Type Word Frequency Control Nonwordl Nonword2
Fairness 1 Equal 90 Dinner Hally Lyste
Fairness 2 Justice 114 Design Buppet Demice
Fairness 3 Unfair 13 Static Fronic Sannut
Safety I Aggress 12 Neglect ••
Fairness 4 Tolerant 9 Deposit Monious Nachor
Fairness 5 Decent 20 Awake Reople Acode
Fairness 6 Bigot 1 Tonic Frade Malor
Fairness 7 Racist I Suitor •* •t
Fairness 8 Prejudice 11 Interpret Roalation Divocle
Fairness 9 Biased 8 Relish Siddle Telmet
Fairness 10 Wrong 129 Piece Staut Wrole
Safety2 Fear 127 Note Blea Bist
Safety3 Risk 54 Seat Ovil Mide
Safety4 Threat 42 Smooth Rellv Prode
Safety5 Alert 33 Owner •*
Safety6 Danger 70 Factor Garin Muder
Safety7 Safety 47 Dollar Volely Sottle
Safety8 Terrorist 1 Material Otusion Vactory
Safety9 Peril 8 Rumor Skade Novet
Safety 10 Violent 33 Museum B layer addice
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Appendix G: Demographics
A. How old are you?
1. between 16 and 20
2. between 21 and 25
3. between 26 and 30
4. between 31 and 35
5. between 36 and 40
6. over 40
B. What is your gender?
1. Female 2. Male
C. What is your ethnic background?
1. Asian/Asian-American
2. African/African-American
3. Arab/Arab-American
4. East Indian
D. What religion best describes you?
1. Atheist
2. Buddhist
3. Catholic/Christian/Protestant
4. Hindu
5. Islamic/Muslim
E. How religious are you?
1. Not at all/in name only
2. Slightly
3. Moderately
F. How often do you fly?
1 .1 have never flown before.
2. Less than once a year
3. Once a year
G. How often do you take the subway?
1. Less than once a year
2. Once or twice a year
3. Once every couple of months
5. Latino/Hispanic
6. Native-American
7. White/Non-Hispanic
8. Other
6. Jewish -  non-Orhodox
7. Jewish Orthodox
8. No religious affiliation
9. Other
4. Quite a bit
5. Very
6. Extremely
4. Two to three times a year
5. Four to six times a year
6. Six times a year or more
4. Once or twice a month
5. About once a week
6. More than three times every week
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Appendix H: Prime -  Tolerance Version
___________ , NJ - The quiet town o f____________ , NJ was unusually
bustling with tension on the night o f October 12th. Squad cars from the 
local police department as well as a swarm of cars from the State Police
were called into a _________ gas station after the night attendant had
alerted the authorities of suspicious activity on the station’s property. The 
attendant, J. H. (name withheld at his own request) had been in the 3rd 
hour of his 10 hour shift when a gray Toyota pulled up next to one of the 
gas pumps.
As is customary at this full service station, Mr. H. exited from his 
booth and walked over to the car to offer his assistance. As J.H. leaned 
over to the driver’s side window, a stout man got out o f the passenger 
side o f the car and, in a strongly accented voice, curtly informed the 
attendant that he would “take care of it”. When J.H. offered to check the 
oil, the stout man mumbled something, following which a second 
individual exited from the back seat of the car. The attendant was then 
asked to stand aside and not interfere. “That guy who came out from the 
backseat, he was big. I mean real big, like 6’3” or something and I could 
tell he wasn’t <expletive> joking”, Mr. H. told us, “he went to open the
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trunk and I saw weird stuff back there. Stuff that looked like wires and 
maybe a detonator. I mean, I really got freaked out”.
The attendant reports that, in light of the September 11th events, his 
first instinct was to alert the authorities but, worried about his own safety, 
he judged it best to wait for them to leave before taking any action. Mr. 
H. went on to describe the situation: “I was standing maybe 20 feet away 
from them and I could hear the driver talking on a cell phone in some 
weird language. Let me tell you that it didn’t make me feel any better. 
Don’t get me wrong, I got nothing against foreigners, I don’t judge 
people based on race. Hell, my own father was an immigrant, but I had a 
real bad feeling about those guys and I don’t care if people call me a 
racist, I just had to do something.” Mr. H. says that the men paid him, got 
back in the car and sped off, not bothering to wait for their change. The 
gas station worker called 911 as soon as he stepped back into his booth. 
Within minutes, the Toyota was stopped a few miles north and the quiet 
neighborhood was suddenly drowned in the sound of sirens and the sight 
of flashing red lights.
The men were immediately arrested and jailed for more than a 
week (two o f the men had expired visas) even though there was nothing 
in that trunk that could suggest any sort of link to terrorism. The “wires”
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were in fact pieces of rope and the “detonator” was nothing more than an 
air pump. Furthermore, it turns out that the driver had been on the phone 
with his sister who was informing him that his wife was about to give 
birth to their first child, hence the reason behind their hurry. Upon 
hearing this, J.H., the embarrassed gas station attendant, told us that he 
felt terribly guilty about the whole incident. He also revealed that his 
only hesitation in calling was that he probably would not have reacted so 
strongly had the men not been Arabic. He then added “Because of me, 
that poor guy didn’t get to see his newborn baby for at least a week. All 
they were trying to do was get to the hospital on time. I feel like such a 
dope, accusing these guys just because of what they looked like. I’ve 
been really unfair to them, they didn’t do anything wrong. Talk about 
being un-American...”.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Appendix I: Prime -  Vigilance Version
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___________ , NJ - The quiet town o f____________ , NJ was unusually
bustling with tension on the night of October 12th. Squad cars from the 
local police department as well as a swarm of cars from the State Police
were called into a _________ gas station after the night attendant had
alerted the authorities of suspicious activity on the station’s property. The 
attendant, J. H. (name withheld to protect his identity) had been in the 3rd 
hour of his 10 hour shift when a gray Toyota pulled up next to one of the 
gas pumps.
As is customary at this full service station, Mr. H. exited from his 
booth and walked over to the car to offer his assistance. As J.H. leaned 
over to the driver’s side window, a stout man got out of the passenger 
side of the car and, in a strongly accented voice, curtly informed the 
attendant that he would “take care of it”. When J.H. offered to check the 
oil, the stout man mumbled something, following which a second 
individual exited from the back seat o f the car. The attendant was then 
asked to stand aside and not interfere. “That guy who came out from the 
backseat, he was big. I mean real big, like 6’3” or something and I could 
tell he wasn’t <expletive> joking”, Mr. H. told us, “he went to open the
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trunk and I saw weird stuff back there. Stuff that looked like wires and 
maybe a detonator. I mean, I really got freaked out”.
The attendant reports that, in light of the September 1 Ith events, his 
first instinct was to alert the authorities but, worried about his own safety, 
he judged it best to wait for them to leave before taking any action. Mr. 
H. went on to describe the situation: “I was standing maybe 20 feet away 
from them and I could hear the driver talking on a cell phone in some 
weird language. Let me tell you that it didn’t make me feel any better. 
Don’t get me wrong, I got nothing against foreigners, I don’t judge 
people based on race. Hell, my own father was an immigrant, but I had a 
real bad feeling about those guys and I don’t care if people call me a 
racist, I just had to do something.” Mr. H. says that the men paid him, got 
back in the car and sped off, not bothering to wait for their change. The 
gas station worker called 9 11 as soon as he stepped back into his booth. 
Within minutes, the Toyota was stopped a few miles north and the quiet 
neighborhood was suddenly drowned in the sound of sirens and the sight 
o f flashing red lights.
The men were arrested and later charged with possession of illegal 
explosives and described a lethal plot that, if successful, would have 
caused the loss of probably hundreds more lives. For reasons o f security,
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the authorities did not reveal the details of the scheme to the press but we 
have been informed that the men had enough explosives to cause 
“considerable damage”. Upon hearing this, J.H., the hero of the night, 
told us that his only hesitation in calling was that he probably would not 
have reacted so strongly had the men not been Arabic. He then added 
“but I couldn’t chance it, it was too weird. Everyone’s got to be on their 
guards. I hope that my story shows people that they have to keep their 
eyes open and that they have to report anything weird. When American 
lives are at stake, I’m not gonna take chances and let a wacko go free”.
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